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According to a 2010 report, the Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 
billion each year on contracts to sustain the organization as an operational military force. 
Since 1992, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified contract 
management within the DOD as an area for high risk in fraud, waste, abuse, and 
mismanagement, and the DOD has not provided enough assurance that they are using 
sound practices in procurement. Failures to meet objectives in cost, schedule, and 
performance have led to cost overruns, reduced buying power, and a reduction in 
capabilities throughout contract administration processes.  
The purpose of this research was to assess internal controls within the DOD 
contract management processes. This assessment was conducted by analyzing reports 
from the DOD Inspector General, which noted deficiencies in the contract management 
processes and weaknesses in the internal control framework. The results of this analysis 
indicate that, overall, the highest numbers of deficiencies in the DOD were found in 
Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, and Contract Administration. In addition, 
overall, the highest numbers of weaknesses were found in Contract Environment, 
Contract Activities, and Risk Assessment. This research may help the DOD address 
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The Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 billion dollars each year on 
contracts to sustain the organization as an operational military force (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2015). The increase in contract actions in the last decade 
has led to increased problems in contract management demonstrating the need for greater 
improvements in these areas (Department of Defense Office of Inspector General 
[DODIG], 2009). Since 1992, the GAO (2015) has identified contract management 
within the DOD as an area for high risk in fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The 
GAO reports that the DOD has not provided enough assurance that they are using sound 
practices in procurement. The GAO has also identified that many DOD programs are 
failing to meet objectives in cost, schedule, and performance (2015). These failures have 
led to an increase in cost overruns, reduced buying power, and a reduction in capabilities. 
The DODIG (2009) audit reports also identified many deficiencies in the DOD 
acquisition and contract administration processes. These problems necessitate a response 
from the DOD to Congress and the American people.  
The DOD acknowledges these concerns and has attempted to improve its 
competencies by increasing the size of the acquisition force and by improving 
procurement training for its workforce. For example, from 2008 to 2014, the DOD 
increased its acquisition workforce size from about 126,000 to 150,000 (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2015). Also, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) 
hired 500 more auditors in 2010 with plans to hire 1,000 additional auditors by 2015 
(Office of Management and Budget [OMB], 2015). The DOD has further conducted 
competency assessments of the acquisition workforce to identify the skills and 
capabilities needed to fix the issues in contract management (GAO, 2015).   
The DOD as a whole has not been able to achieve consistent practices in contract 
management, even with an increase in acquisition workforce and an improvement in 
procurement training. The DOD still lacks auditability in contract management that 
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ensures integrity, accountability, and transparency. Auditability is highly dependent on 
competent people, capable processes, and effective internal controls (Rendon & Rendon, 
2015). According to the DODIG (2009), many of the deficiencies in the DOD acquisition 
and contract management processes are a result of material internal control weaknesses. 
In order to reduce weaknesses and ensure auditability in contract management, the DOD 
needs to have effective internal controls (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). 
B. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH 
The purpose of this research is to assess internal controls within the Department 
of Defense contract management. This assessment was conducted by analyzing DODIG-
reported deficiencies in the contract management processes with relation to weaknesses 
found in the internal control framework. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research addresses the following research questions: 
• Which contract management processes are related to the DODIG-reported 
deficiencies? 
• Which internal controls components are related to the DODIG-reported 
weaknesses?   
• What patterns or consistencies does the data from the DODIG reports 
show regarding the deficiencies in contract management processes and 
weaknesses in internal control components? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This research includes a review of recent literature regarding internal controls and 
contract management, specifically on the integration of internal controls in contract 
management. The literature review consists of government reports, which describe the 
importance of contracting within the DOD, outline contract management processes, and 
explain internal control components. Additionally, literature was reviewed regarding 
auditability theory and the general characteristics of the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organization of the Treadway Commission (COSO) internal control framework. The 
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literature review is followed by an analysis of the DODIG reports to identify weaknesses 
in internal controls within contract management processes. Finally, this report concludes 
with recommendations for improvements in the DOD’s contract management processes 
and internal controls and identifies areas for further research.  
E. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS 
This research assesses deficiencies in the DOD’s procurement processes and 
weaknesses in the internal controls based on the analysis of the DODIG’s reported 
deficiencies in contract management. One aspect of this analysis describes the 
relationship between the DODIG’s reported contracting deficiencies, internal controls, 
and contract management processes. The results will provide the DOD with 
recommendations on how to improve internal controls and contract management 
processes.  
This research is limited to collecting and analyzing the DODIG’s reports 
identifying deficiencies in DOD contract management. Another limitation is that the 
DODIG’s reports used in this research are from 2003 to 2010.  
F. ORGANIZATION OF REPORT 
This research is composed of five chapters, including this introduction chapter. 
Chapter II consists of a literature review of the DOD’s contracting environment and 
current problems, DOD initiatives to address those current problems, auditability theory, 
contract management processes, and internal control components. Building on this 
literature review, Chapter III provides the methodology for this research, examines the 
source of data, discusses the development of the assessment tool, and describes how data 
was analyzed. Chapter IV provides the research findings, the analysis of the findings, and 
the implications of the findings. This chapter also provides recommendations for how the 
DOD can improve contract management processes and internal controls. Chapter V 




This chapter provided an introduction and background to this research. In this 
chapter, the purpose of the research, the research questions, and the methodology used in 
this research were discussed. Additionally, this chapter provided the benefits and 
limitations of the research as well as the organization of this report. The next chapter 
provides the foundation for the research by presenting a literature review that covers the 
DOD contracting environment and its current problems, DOD initiatives to address those 



















II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This literature review explains the DOD contracting environment, its current 
problems, and the DOD’s initiatives in response to these problems. It also covers 
auditability theory, contract management processes, and internal control components. 
This review shapes the essential organization of information for this research and 
provides a baseline for following chapters.   
B. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT 
DOD contracting comprised 8% of all federal government spending in 2015. The 
DOD’s budget has increased from $190 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2000 to the current 
$290 billion in FY 2015 (Schwartz, Ginsberg, & Sargent, 2015). DOD contracting in FY 
2014 was comprised of 10% research and development (R&D) contract obligations, 45% 
of services contract obligations, and 45% of goods and supplies contract obligations 
(Schwartz, Ginsberg, & Sargent, 2015). The government must ensure they have the 
appropriate workforce and contract management processes to manage these areas 
mentioned effectively and must provide verification that the citizen taxpayer is receiving 
sufficient quality and quantity for contracted services and supplies (Schwartz, Ginsberg, 
& Sargent, 2015). Because of acquisition workforce issues, contracting techniques and 
processes non-compliance, and failure to adhere to policy and statutory requirements in 
the DOD, contracting efforts continue to reflect a high risk. Some complex issues in the 
contracting environment include having the right number of people and the appropriate 
resources to reduce risk, the use of various methods to monitor progress, and the 
implementation of corrective actions needed to reduce risk (GAO, 2015). The 
acknowledged GAO issues have resulted in the DOD applying several initiatives to help 
mitigate the risk.  
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1. Impact 
The contracting impact to the DOD is important to have oversight on because of 
high amount of contracts awarded for goods and services. In FY 2015, the DOD 
disbursed over $200 billion in contracts awarded with 1,335,179 transactions (OMB, 
2015). The DOD as a whole spent $560.4 billion total, including $64.2 billion in funds 
for overseas contingency operations (OCO) (OUSD [Comptroller], 2015). The immense 
number of dollars spent and transactions processed is problematic to the acquisition 
workforce because the workforce has been inadequate in quantity and skill level of 
people (GAO, 2015). 
2. Problems  
Some of the problems with DOD contracting have been in acquiring and retaining 
the proper acquisition workforce, complying with contract management policy, and 
providing advanced training for personnel. These problems have led the GAO to continue 
to assess contract management as a “high risk” since 1992 (GAO, 2015).  
The first problem is acquiring and retaining the proper acquisition workforce. To 
properly manage the acquisition of goods and services, the DOD will have to address the 
proper workload ratio to contract transactions processed, as well as attrition due to 
retirement (Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2010). Denis states, “The real 
problem is that the public contracting workforce is insufficient in both numbers and 
training. The number of contracting professionals has not kept the pace with contracting 
dollars, and public agencies have not sufficiently invested in the training of their 
contracting staffs” (Denis, 2009, p. 62). This problem is partially due to budget 
constraints and people retiring.    
Leadership in the DOD acknowledged the workforce problem in a DOD Strategic 
Capital Plan report, which cited increased contract actions from $138 billion in 2001 to 
$384 billion in 2009 (Defense Acquisitions University, 2010). Simultaneously, the 
workforce decreased by 2.6%. The DOD Strategic Capital Plan updated report of 2010 
also explains that 16% of the civilian acquisition workforce was eligible to retire in 2009 
with 37.5% becoming eligible to retire by 2020 (Defense Acquisitions University, 2010). 
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Rendon and Snider (2008) state, “The pending departure of the Baby Boomer generation 
contracting workforce will require the DOD to continue to take action to recruit, retain, 
and train the contracting workforce.” Figure 1 illustrates the impact of an aging 
workforce. 
Figure 1.  Overall DAW (Military & Civilian) Retirement Eligibility 
Distribution—FY12Q1 (12-31-11) 
 
Source: Defense Acquisition University (DAU). (2012). Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Update: 2012 Acq Demo Conference. Retrieved from https://dap.dau.mil/ 
workforce/Documents/AcqDemo/Keynote%20Address%20-%20AcqDemo%20HCI% 
20brief.pdf 
The second problem is getting the acquisition workforce to comply with 
contracting policies within each of the contract management processes, which are 
procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract 
administration, and contract closeout (Rendon & Snider, 2008, p.164). A lack of 
oversight in contract management’s compliance with policy creates a loss of confidence 
with the stakeholders.  
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The third problem, according to the GAO, is that the DOD needs to adhere to 
statutory requirements, such as assessments of the critical skills and competencies of its 
workforce. The DOD needs to ensure that they have the correct number of people with 
appropriate skills and capacities, sufficient tools, and adequate data to make informed 
acquisition decisions. These factors are critical for achieving the warfighters’ missions. 
DOD leadership involvement is essential to building on the progress made in addressing 
these ongoing problems (DAU, 2010). 
C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INITIATIVES 
The DOD has responded with various initiatives including making improvements 
in the acquisition workforce by hiring more personnel, adding new policies and guidance, 
re-emphasizing compliance with policy, and adding supplementary or advanced 
acquisition training for personnel. The defense acquisition workforce initiatives are 
recruiting, hiring, training, developing, and retaining the workforce. The DOD resolved 
some of the problems with the acquisition workforce by increasing the number and the 
quality of their personnel. For example, in 2008, the DOD workforce consisted of 
126,000 personnel, processing 1,608,959 contract transactions (DAU, 2010). In 2014, the 
workforce had expanded to 150,000 personnel, processing 1,361,325 contract 
transactions (DAU, 2010).  
In 2005, the undersecretary of defense for acquisition, technology, and logistics 
(USD[AT&L]) helped form a Defense Science Board Task Force (DSBTF) led by Dr. 
William Schneider. The DSBTF reviewed oversight of management and acquisition 
activities and assessed policies to recommend changes to internal controls within the 
DOD. The DSBTF advised the DOD to hire more auditors and conduct more audits 
(USD[AT&L], 2005). The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2008 section 
852 empowered the workforce and improved its acquisition support with a Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Development Fund (DAWDF), which was established by Title 10 
U.S.C. 1705. In response to these DSBTF initiatives, the DOD hired an average of 200 to 
300 auditors from 2005 to 2009, and hired 500 more auditors in 2010 to assist with 
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massive amounts of contract actions. The DOD proposed plans to hire 1000 more 
auditors by 2015 (OMB, 2015).  
In 2009, in the USD(AT&L), the Honorable Ashton B. Carter re-established the 
Defense Acquisition Workforce Senior Steering Board (DAWSSB) to help advance 
acquisition workforce initiatives. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) 
implemented a phased retirement plan in 2014 that allowed full-time employees to work 
a part-time schedule while beginning to draw benefits. The hiring initiatives appeared to 
be on track as of 2010, according to USD(AT&L) Carter, who said, “The Department 
must act now on its strategy to increase its acquisition management, technical and 
business capability, and capacity to manage and oversee the acquisition process from 
start to finish” (DAU, 2010, p. 3). In this quote, Carter is discussing tools used by the 
acquisition workforce, such as contract management policies and DAWDF funding. The 
Army, Navy, and Air Force have acted in response to the USD(AT&L) order by 
continuing to use the DAWDF section 852 to empower their acquisition workforce by 
closing the workforce gaps and adjusting human capital strategies.  
The DOD’s Program Executive Officers (PEOs) are constantly developing new 
methods to help train their workforce. In addition, PEOs are using resources offered by 
the DOD, academia, and industry to enhance the workforce’s knowledge. For example, 
the Army has partnered with the Naval Postgraduate School to create a master of science 
in systems engineering degree and a master of business administration in acquisition and 
contract management. The Army’s Research, Development, and Engineering Command 
(RDECOM) has established a supportive research and development agreement with the 
Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC) to develop new methods and approaches 
for complex System of System (SoS) problems. RDECOM and SERC are also working 
with DAU to enhance courses such as SYS 350, Systems Engineering (SE) technical 
leadership course. The Navy is using an Acquisition Workforce Strategic Plan to grow 
the workforce by 16% from 2010 to 2015. The Navy has a close relationship with the 
Naval Postgraduate School because of the branch affiliation and has implemented a 
systems engineering career model (SECM) to empower its workforce. The Air Force 
enhanced its skills to attract and shape the best possible workforce using a program called 
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Bright Horizons, which is a science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) strategic 
roadmap program. The Air Force also created a career path tool to help manage and assist 
airmen in their career paths (DOD [DT&E], 2012)  
Another initiative was to improve the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) certification levels in the workforce by positions. DAWIA 
provides for the proficiency levels of personnel through mandatory requirements in 
education, training, and experience. In 2009, only 59% of the workforce met the DAWIA 
certification requirements. By 2014, the workforce was able to meet 79% of the DAWIA 
certification requirements (DAU, 2015b). Additionally, from 2009 to 2014, there was a 
33% increase in the acquisition workforce’s ability to meet or exceed DAWIA 
certification requirements, demonstrating the efficacy of this initiative (DAU, 2015b). 
The Honorable Frank Kendall, USD(AT&L), also helped try to address educating 
the acquisition workforce by launching advanced certification criteria with his 
memorandum Better Buying Power 3.0 (OUSD[AT&L], 2014). During 2010 to 2015, the 
Secretary of Defense has added supplementary or advanced acquisition training for 
personnel by expanding contracting officer representative (COR) training and enhancing 
training for contract specialists, program managers, systems engineers, and pricing 
personnel. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has implemented a new curriculum for 
high impact and emerging acquisition needs and new certification structures and training 
for the “Big A” workforce (DAU, 2010). The DOD’s response to its workforce 
challenges was hiring additional workforce, providing additional training and guidance, 
and establishing higher certification level requirements, but what is missing in the 
response is the focus on internal controls. The next section includes a discussion of 
auditability theory and the importance of internal controls in assuring auditability in 
organizations. 
D. AUDITABILITY THEORY 
The DOD needs to be concerned with auditability because auditability is essential 
for contract management organizations to ensure integrity, accountability, and 
transparency. The theory of auditability encompasses the following three aspects of 
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governance, which include competent personnel, capable processes, and effective internal 
controls. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between these three aspects of governance. 
Hence, the DOD desires to improve the function of a competent procurement workforce, 
capable procurement processes, and effective internal controls to achieve its contract 
management goals and objectives (Rendon & Rendon, 2015). The three aspects of 
auditability are discussed in the following subsection. 
Figure 2.  Auditability Triangle 
 
Source: Rendon, R. G., & Rendon, J. M. (2015). Auditability in public procurement: an 
analysis of internal controls and fraud vulnerability. Manuscript submitted for conference 
proceedings. 
1. Competent People 
Auditability relates to the competency of personnel engaged in the contract 
management functions of the organization. It encompasses the education, training, and 
experience requirements of team members for each function in the organization (Rendon 
& Rendon, 2015). The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) 
provides for the competency of personnel through mandatory requirements in education, 
training, and experience. DAWIA ensures that each member of the acquisition workforce 
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is qualified to perform his or her particular function. When Carter was the undersecretary 
of defense (AT&L), he said, “Workforce size is important, but quality is paramount” 
(DAU, 2015b). 
2. Capable Processes 
Auditability also relates to the capable processes of an organization, specifically 
with their contract management activities. As discussed previously, contract management 
has six processes, which include procurement planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, 
source selection, contract administration, and contract closeout (Rendon and Snider, 
2008, p.164). The capabilities of these processes are measured with regards to processes 
that are “fully-established, institutionalized, mandated, integrated with other 
organizational processes, periodically measured, and continuously improved” (Rendon & 
Rendon, 2015, p. 7).   
3. Effective Internal Controls 
The internal controls aspect regarding auditability relates to implementing 
effective internal controls in organizations in order to ensure compliance with laws and 
regulations, ensure activities are monitored, and ensure material weaknesses are reported 
(Rendon & Rendon, 2015). Internal controls are typically discussed in regards to the five 
internal control components established by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). In 2013, the COSO established 17 principles 
associated with each of the five internal control components.  The next section further 
discusses details about the contract management processes and internal controls.    
E. CONTRACT MANAGEMENT PROCESSES  
Contract management processes from the government perspective are divided into 
three main phases called the pre-award, award, and post award. These phases are then 
sub-divided into the six contract management processes, which include procurement 
planning, solicitation planning, solicitation, source selection, contract administration, and 
contract closeout (Garrett, 2010, p. 20). The pre-award phase consists of procurement 
planning, solicitation planning, and solicitation, wherein the government decides to make 
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or buy the product or service, and the seller decides to bid or not bid on the project. The 
next phase is the award phase, which consists of source selection, wherein the 
government awards the contract to the contractor in a well-defined relationship based on 
a written agreement, which details the rights and responsibilities of each party. The last 
phase is the post-award phase, in which the responsibilities of contract administration and 
contract closeout are conducted. Figure 3 outlines the three phases and six processes of 
contract management visually, but the importance of these six processes are described in 
more specificity in later sections. 
Figure 3.  Contract Management Processes 
 
Source: Garrett, G. A. (2010). World class contracting (5th ed.). Riverwoods, IL: CCH, p. 
80. 
1. Procurement Planning 
The contracting activity starts with the procurement planning phase as seen in 
Figure 3. The procurement planning phase is part of the pre-award phase and is an 
important part of contract management because it establishes the foundation for future 
successes or problems. The procurement planning process includes determining and 
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defining the procurement requirement, conducting market research, and developing 
requirements documents (Garrett, 2010, p. 80). Garrett summarizes the first process: 
Procurement planning is the process of identifying which business needs 
can be best met by procuring products or services outside the organization. 
This process involves determining whether to procure, how to procure, 
what to procure, how much to procure, and when to procure. (Garrett, 
2010, p. 81) 
To conduct procurement planning appropriately, the government first defines the 
requirement, then conducts market research, and finally develops requirements 
documents to ensure the products or services will achieve quality, cost, schedule, and 
performance outcomes.  
a. Determining and Defining the Procurement Requirement 
In procurement planning, the first step in planning is defining what is required and 
developing the acquisition plan. The first question to address is whether the government 
is looking to purchase supplies or services. The customers or end users must decide what 
their requirements are in order to purchase the correct supplies or services. The customers 
should also be involved in the procurement planning process, and they should be asking 
several questions that will help determine the right mechanism to use in the procurement 
of the requirements. According to Federal Acquisition Regulation (2015) Part 7, these 
questions include: 
• Should the customer go with commercial or government resources for the 
required supplies and services?  
• Does the customer want to outsource the requirement or accomplish it 
together with a contractor?  
• Should the customer buy or lease a product?  
• Has the government purchased similar products or services?  
• What is the timeline for the supplies or services needed?  
• Is the supply or service the customer wants to buy inherently 
governmental? (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 2015, Part 7)  
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The answers to these questions are based on the need of the organization to 
properly define the requirement and on the approval of key leadership and stakeholders 
(Chang, 2013). In most general acquisitions, the stakeholders are the customer’s 
organization, technical experts, key leadership, and the contracting officer within the 
originating activity. In larger acquisitions, stakeholders are appointed to an integrated 
product team (IPT) that includes some of the following personnel: a program manager, a 
contracting officer, a contracting officer representative, a technical lead, a technical 
support subject-matter expert, a financial officer, a legal officer, and personnel within the 
customer’s organization. The organization’s key leadership should ensure that the 
originating requester, the identified subject-matter experts, and the contracting officer 
understand the requirements to ensure that their mission is successful.  
b. Conducting Market Research 
Market research is determining who sells what the buyer requires, who else buys 
what the buyer requires, and how they buy it (Garrett, 2010)? Market research also helps 
determine if the capabilities to perform the effort are available commercially, non-
developmentally, or by using government resources. The necessary extent of market 
research varies depending on several factors: urgency, complexity, dollar value, and past 
experience. The agency should determine if the requirement could be provided by 
competition or sole source during market research. Competition is also an important part 
of government contracting and is mandated according to the FAR Part 6. The contracting 
officer must ensure that the legitimate needs of the requirement are identified and 
evaluate the tradeoffs to acquire the item. Sources of market research are evaluated based 
on public information on the company, company feedback, and previous buying 
experience with the business. Understanding the requirements provides a foundation to 
determine what types of strategies to employ, the type of contracting methods to use, and 
exceptions that may apply to the procurement process.  
c. Developing Requirements Documents 
The requirements documents in the procurement planning phase depend on the 
complexity of the requirement. According to Rendon and Snider (2008), the requirements 
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documents become a part of the solicitation package. The solicitation package is usually 
developed by either an invitation for bid (IFB) or a request for proposal (RFP), depending 
on the selected procurement process. The FAR Part 11 prescribes which documents are 
mandated for use by law, but also allows for the use of existing or modified documents if 
it meets the needs of the agency. The requirements documents describe the desired 
outcomes of the supplies or services in the procurement process (Rendon & Snider, 
2008). Different types of requirements documents are utilized based on the agencies’ 
specific requirements. A Performance Work Statement (PWS) is a performance-based 
document that explains the required results in well-defined, precise, and unbiased terms 
with measurable outcomes. A Statement of Objectives (SOO) is a document that is 
prepared by the government describing the required performance objectives. A Statement 
of Work (SOW) establishes and describes all non-specific requirements for the 
contractors work performance with the use of precise documents (DAU, 2015a). FAR 
Part 11 defines the order of precedence for requirements documents within the 
procurement process. The requirements documents order of precedence is stated as 
follows:  
1. Documents mandated for use by law; 
2. Performance-oriented documents (e.g., a PWS or SOO); 
3. Detailed design-oriented documents;  
4. Standards, specifications, and related publications issued by the 
Government outside the Defense or Federal series for non-repetitive 
acquisition of items. (FAR, 11.101)  
2. Solicitation Planning  
Solicitation planning is also part of the pre-award phase and comes after the 
completion of the procurement planning process. Solicitation planning utilizes the 
findings discovered from market research and the documents produced to complete the 
plan. Rendon and Snider (2008) state that solicitation planning is “the process of 
preparing the documents needed to support the solicitation. This process involves 
documenting program requirements and identifying potential sources” (Rendon & Snider, 
2008, p. 167). The solicitation planning process includes determining the appropriate 
procurement method, selecting the appropriate contract type, and establishing evaluation 
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criteria. The evaluation criteria are then applied to selecting the successful awardee(s) 
(Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
a. Determining the Appropriate Procurement Method 
Determining the appropriate procurements method to use for a supply or service 
can seem challenging due to a myriad of reasons such as cost, availability of sources, 
complexity, and potential risk. The FAR is helpful to the buyer in that it establishes 
mandated ceiling thresholds. The Government Purchase Card (GPC) is the preferred 
method when using the micro-purchase method for procurement because it allows the 
customer the ability to get mission essential requirements acquired for simple buys. As of 
October 1, 2015, the current micro-purchase base threshold is $3,500 (FAR 2.101). FAR 
Part 13 Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) details the procedures outlined within 
the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT), which is not to exceed $150,000 (FAR 
13.003(b)(1)). For acquisitions above the SAT, FAR Part 15.101 gives the acquisition 
team the ability to utilize best value continuum to determine the complexity and potential 
risk in procurement and allows them to choose a sealed bid and/or a negotiated 
procurement. Lowest Priced Technically Acceptable (LPTA) is commonly used for 
supplies or services that are easily defined and the price is the most influential 
consideration. The tradeoff process is appropriate when price is not the influential 
consideration and the requirement is more complex in nature with higher risk. The 
government must also decide how to compete the procurement requirements by assessing 
if they will award a contract based on full and open competition or under sole source 
(Garrett, 2010). Figure 4 outlines the competitive and non-competitive processes of 
awarding the contract with specific steps to help guide the contracting officer and team in 






Figure 4.  Comparison of Contracting Methods  
 
Source: Garrett, G. A. (2010). World class contracting (5th ed.). Riverwoods, IL: CCH, p. 
76. 
Public policy, specifically FAR 6.101, requires “that contracting officers shall 
promote and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding 
Government contracts” (FAR 6.101, 2015). The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 
(CICA) mandates promoting competition in awarding government contracts, and it was 
re-emphasized by President Obama in a March 2009 memorandum on government 
contracting (Manuel, 2011). The CICA remains a foundation for competition 30 years 
later as it places efficiency in the agencies’ missions, helps to prevent fraud, and benefits 
the overall best public interest (Manuel, 2011).  
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Another important public policy is the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 
1994 (FASA) that allowed for a shift in preference from the acquisition of items 
developed specifically for the government to the acquisition of commercial items. The 
FASA promotes maximum use of commercial acquisition to meet the government’s 
requests in addition to allowing increased commercial market practices. Source selection 
must be made on the best value and not always the lowest price basis. The FASA’s 
preference for commercial items is included in FAR 1.102 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011). The 
FASA was then followed by the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 (FARA), which 
placed efficiency on fullfilling government requirements by amending the FAR to ensure 
full and open competition is implemented with the government’s best interest in mind 
(Manuel, 2011). In 2003, the Services Acquisition Reform Act (SARA) was passed 
allowing special types of contracts to be treated as commercial items in certain 
conditions.  
From 2006 to 2009, a swinging pendulum effect took place in the DOD 
commercial world, tightening the policies that had once been encouraged. The DOD 
Authorization Act of 2006 became more restrictive in commercial acquisition procedures 
for major weapon systems in that it required the secretary of defense to determine 
whether a certain procurement would meet the definition of a commercial item, to 
determine that national security objectives would meet the criteria for purchase, and to 
give Congress a 30-day notice before purchase. In 2008, the National Defense 
Authorization Act limited terms for major weapon systems (DFARS 234.7002), and in 
2009, it restricted commercial services “of a type” sold on the commercial market 
(Stockman, Ross, Bongiovi, & Sparks, 2011; FAR 15.403-1(c)(3)(ii)). However, the 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) of 2008 did authorize the Secretary of 
Treasury to use other than full and open competition for urgent and compelling 
circumstances (Manuel, 2011). Rendon and Snider (2008) also discuss the government’s 
accountability to public policy. However, not all public policy objectives allow for 
streamlining of acquisition processes to the government (Rendon and Snider, 2008). For 
example, conforming to the 1933 Buy America Act might cost the DOD more in cost, 
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schedule, and performance in the long run instead of procuring from a foreign 
competitor.   
b. Selecting the Appropriate Contract Type 
Selecting the appropriate contract type is a critical step in the contract 
management process because it needs to provide flexibility in acquiring supplies or 
services. The contract team will decide which contract type and structure to use based on 
the requirement and the benefits to the government. Contract types include two broad 
categories, which are fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts according to FAR 
16.101. Fixed-price contracts have a set price and are defined as a standard business 
pricing arrangement for contracts. The three types of fixed-price are firm-fixed price 
(FFP), fixed-price with economic adjustment (FP/EPA), and fixed-price incentive. Fixed 
price contracts are the preferred contract type for the government because they present 
the lowest risk and place a majority of risk on the contractor. Cost-reimbursement 
contracts, on the other hand, are used when the actual costs are unknown and the projects 
requirements might also be unknown. The six types of cost-reimbursement contracts are 
cost-sharing (CS), cost-reimbursement (CR), cost-plus-incentive fee (CPIF), cost-plus-
award fee (CPAF), cost-plus-fixed fee (CPFF), and cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost 
(CPPC). It should be noted that CPPC contracts are not allowed in the federal 
government. Cost-reimbursement contracts, in general, place much more risk on the 
government and less on the contractor, as the end product is less defined.  
In addition, there are contract instruments that can be used to assist the 
government in getting the best value. Two of these contract instruments are indefinite 
delivery indefinite quantity (IDIQ) and blanket purchase agreements (BPA), which can 
provide the government flexibility on ordering recurring requirements. Figure 5 shows 
the contract types and risk involved with each type of contract when selecting the 





Figure 5.  Contract Types and Risk 
 
Source: Garrett, G. A. (2010). World class contracting (5th ed.). Riverwoods, IL: CCH, p. 
127. 
c. Establishing Evaluation Criteria  
Establishing the evaluation criteria is a critical step in the procurement process 
because it signals what the most important areas to be graded are and presents a guideline 
to potential offerors in how the contract will be awarded. Evaluation criteria are 
important in the following three areas: cost or price evaluation, past performance 
evaluation, and technical evaluation (FAR 15.304–305). Criteria are usually discussed 
and defined in objective and threshold values and terms. The performance measures 
provide the basis for collecting the information to evaluate and answer the contracting 
team’s questions in regards to the requirements. The criteria should also be unambiguous 
and the objectives should be measurable either qualitatively or quantitatively (DAU, 
2014). In a negotiated procurement, the evaluation strategy may decide if lowest price 
technically acceptable (LPTA) or tradeoff process is in the government’s best interest in 
the selection. In LPTA, the government achieves the best value with the lowest price 
technically acceptable offer (FAR 15.102-2(a)). The tradeoff process is where the 
government will consider an award to other than the lowest price offeror or the highest 
technically rated offeror (FAR 5.101-1(a)). The technical factors measure whether the 
contractor’s proposal will meet the government’s requirements (FAR 15.305(3)(i)). A 
technical risk evaluation will be assessed using a summary, a matrix, or quantitative 
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rankings along with supporting documentation for each evaluation factor (FAR 
15.305(3)(ii)). Establishing appropriate evaluation criteria early in the procurement 
process allows the contracting team to choose the best value for the government and 
helps mitigate future protest. The Defense Acquisition University (DAU) BCA 
guidebook says that evaluation criteria are “the most critical and difficult components of 
a business case analysis (BCA)” (DAU, 2014). Finally, it is critical to identify and define 
the appropriate evaluation criteria in order to ensure that the proposals will be graded 
fairly and meets the government’s requirements.  
3. Solicitation  
Solicitation is also part of the pre-award phase and comes after the completion of 
the solicitation planning process. In the solicitation process, the contracting officer begins 
formal interaction with industry by holding a pre-proposal conference and advertising the 
requirement. The contracting officer can deliver the requirement to industry orally, 
physically, or electronically using the following procurement documents: the request for 
proposal (RFP), request for quote (RFQ), invitation for bids (IFB), invitation to bid 
(ITB), and invitation for negotiations (IFN) (Garrett, 2010). Regardless of the solicitation 
method, the government should ensure that a high-quality solicitation is released to 
ensure success. Garrett emphasizes this point: “Better solicitations from the buyer 
generally result in having better bids, quotes, proposals, or tenders submitted by the seller 
in a more timely manner. Poorly communicated solicitations often result in delays, 
confusion, fewer bids or proposals, and lower-quality responses” (Garrett, 2010, p. 24).  
a. Pre-Proposal Conference  
The pre-proposal conference is an important step in the solicitation process 
because it serves as a forum for the organization and the offerors to better understand the 
requirements and capabilities of the acquisition. Pre-proposal conferences provide an 
early exchange of information amongst industry, the program manager, and the 
contracting officer, to identify and resolve concerns regarding the acquisition. The main 
topics discussed with industry at these pre-proposal conferences is the strategy, proposed 
contract type, terms and conditions, planning schedules to determine the feasibility of 
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performing the requirements, and the suitability of the proposal instructions and 
evaluation criteria (FAR 15.201(c)). The pre-proposal conference allows industry the 
chance to ask questions and make suggestions that can help the government get the best 
products or services by making revisions or amendments to the solicitation (FAR 15.409 
(c)(1)(2)). 
b. Advertising Requirements  
Advertising requirements are defined in FAR Part 5 and require contracting 
officers to disseminate the information on the proposed contract in multiple ways 
depending on the dollar amounts. For contract actions that exceed $25,000, the 
contracting officer must provide a synopsis of the proposed contract action, solicitations, 
and associated information using the government point of entry (GPE), which is usually 
broadcasted using a uniform resource locator (URL) at either the Federal Business 
Opportunities (FedBizOpps; http://fedbizopps.gov) or the General Services 
Administration (GSA; http://www.gsa.gov; FAR 5.101(1)). For contracts between 
$15,000 and $25,000, they can be distributed by displaying them in a public place or by 
any appropriate electronic means that can be accessed by the general public (FAR 
5.101(2)(iii)). The purpose of the GPE is to ensure competition, to broaden industry 
participation to meet the government’s requirements, and to support socio-economic 
programs and disadvantaged businesses in helping them obtain contracts and subcontracts 
with the government. Potential contractors in this category might include small 
businesses, veteran-owned small businesses, service-disabled/veteran-owned small 
businesses, HUB-Zone small businesses, small disadvantaged businesses, and women-
owned small businesses (FAR 5.002(a)(b)(c)).   
4. Source Selection  
Source selection is a part of the award phase and comes after the completion of 
the solicitation process. In the source selection process, the government acquisition team 
methodically evaluates all the submitted proposals and selects an awardee. 
Communication is conducted with the offerors during the source selection in order to 
help the government achieve the best value from the submitted proposals. Source 
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selections are directed by the source selection organization that evaluates the proposals 
and communicates concerns with the offerors to clarify any misunderstandings about the 
proposal that might need to be revised.     
a. Source Selection Organization  
The DOD Source Selection Procedures describe the source selection organization 
as a cross-functional representative team that includes the Source Selection Authority 
(SSA), the Source Selection Team (SST), the procuring contracting officer (PCO), the 
Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB), the Source Selection Advisory Council 
(SSAC), the small business specialist, cost or pricing experts, and legal personnel 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2011b, p. 2). In the source selection organization, the contracting officer 
has the SSA authority for most contracts up to $100 million. The SST is a team that is 
required to perform a source selection when the contract exceeds $100 million. Due to 
the high-dollar amount, the SSAC also provides assistance to the SSA to ensure 
appropriate analysis of the evaluation results. The PCO is responsible for the 
administrative and contract sections of the acquisition, which also entails performing 
SSA duties. The SSA appoints the SSEB chair members and safeguards the source 
selection process as directed by FAR 3.104 and DFARS 203.104 (OUSD[AT&L], 2011b, 
p. 4). The SSEB is a group of government and non-government personnel (if approved) 
that have great experience in their fields. The SSEB is divided into three main teams, 
which include the technical team, the past performance team, and the cost and pricing 
team. These teams assess the proposals and the evaluation criteria to ensure technical 
feasibility, past performance, and cost price realism to achieve the government’s best 
value in the transaction. The SSAC also consists of senior individuals, team members, 
and a chair that provide written analysis with recommendations to the SSA as well as 
comparative analysis of the SSEB evaluation results.  
b. Evaluating Proposals  
Evaluating proposals is a process where the SSEB scores each proposal against 
the importance of the evaluation factors and sub-factors of the solicited RFP document. 
During this process, it is critical that the SSEB assess the appropriate criteria in their 
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selection, including cost or price evaluation, technical rating evaluation, past 
performance, and socio-economic factors. FAR 15.4 and the contract pricing guide state 
that “cost or price to the Government shall be evaluated in every source selection” 
(OUSD[AT&L], 2011b, p. 14). Depending on the complexity of the source selection, the 
level of analysis will fluctuate; however, no adjectival ratings shall be used in evaluating 
cost or price. The PCO will provide a sufficient description of the cost or price 
evaluation, and the analysis must determine that the cost or price evaluation was fair and 
reasonable. The PCO must also conduct cost realism analysis on all cost reimbursement 
contracts. Cost realism analysis should also be conducted on contracts that are 
competitive, on fixed-price incentive contracts, or on contracts that take extraordinary 
effort or risk (OUSD[AT&L], 2011b). The technical rating evaluation is a criteria tool 
that uses a technical risk rating assessment to identify weaknesses that could potentially 
impact costs, present schedule delays, create performance shortfalls, and necessitate 
additional government oversight. Past performance is a criteria tool that uses information 
obtained from sources available to the government, including Past Performance 
Information Retrieval System (PPIRS), Federal Awardee Performance and Integrity 
Information System (FAPIIS), Electronic Subcontract Reporting System (eSRS), and 
other interviews or databases. The last criteria, socio-economic factors evaluation is a 
tool that considers small business participation as one of the higher factors or sub-factors 
when evaluating the sole source selection (OUSD[AT&L], 2011b) 
c. Clarifications, Communications, Discussions, and Revisions 
In the source selection process, FAR Part 15 addresses clarifications, awards 
without discussions, communications and exchanges with offerors, establishment of the 
competitive range, limits on exchanges, and proposal revisions. The government uses 
clarifications when they expect to award a contract without discussions, but they can use 
rationale to conduct discussions if necessary. Clarifications are limited exchanges 
between the government and the offeror and allow the offeror to modify only minor 
clerical errors of their proposal (FAR 15.306(a), 2015). Communications with the 
offerors before the establishment of the competitive range provide the government with 
an understanding of the proposals and a reasonable interpretation of the proposal. It also 
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gives the offeror an opportunity to provide an explanation for adverse past behavior in 
order to facilitate the government’s evaluation process (FAR 15.306(b), 2015). 
Communications with offerors not in the competitive range provide the government a list 
of the most highly rated efficient proposals. The contracting officer will then send the 
offerors a notice that they are no longer eligible for the competitive range and will be 
eliminated for consideration of an award. The offerors may ask for a debriefing upon 
being eliminated to give them insight to the reason why they were eliminated (FAR 
15.306(c), 2015). Communications with the offerors after the establishment of the 
competitive range allows the government to conduct negotiations on price, schedule, 
technical requirements, and contract type. They can also address deficiencies, 
weaknesses, or other terms of a proposed contract in order to obtain the best value (FAR 
15.306(d), 2015). Negotiations that are conducted after the establishment of the 
competitive range are called discussions if they are in a competitive acquisition (FAR 
15.306(d), 2015). The government is not allowed to exchange favors with one vendor, 
reveal offeror’s technical answers, disclose offeror’s intellectual property, disclose 
offeror’s price without permission, or disclose the results of the evaluation. The 
contracting officer may, however, inform offerors that their price is considered too high 
or too low (FAR 15.306(e), 2015). The contracting officer may request or allow proposed 
revisions to document agreements during negotiations (FAR 15.307(b), 2015). 
5. Contract Administration  
Contract administration is a part of the post-award phase and comes after the 
completion of the source selection process. In the source selection process, the 
government selects the source and awards the contract to the winners. Contract 
administration usually starts with a pre-performance conference and sets the stage for 
monitoring and measuring of the contractor’s performance. Contract modifications occur 
in this process if needed, and the process is finished when the payment or invoice process 
is completed (Rendon & Snider, 2008). 
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a. Monitoring and Measuring Performance  
Monitoring and measuring a contractor’s performance is an important process in 
contract administration because it gives the government a way to ensure that the 
procurement objectives are met. During the contract performance period, the SOW 
becomes the primary document used by the contractor to perform the requirements. The 
government assigns administrative contracting officers, contracting officer 
representatives (COR), and evaluators to oversee the contractor’s performance. The 
government uses different evaluators depending on the type of contract such as: quality 
assurance evaluators (QAE), quality assurance representatives (QAR), or contracting 
officer’s technical representatives (COTR). Rendon and Snider (2008) state, “These 
technical representatives act as the contracting officer’s eyes and ears in terms of 
ensuring the contractor meets the technical requirements of the contract” (p. 177). 
Performance management becomes paramount because it allows the government to stay 
in compliance with cost, schedule, performance, and quality. One quantitative way that 
performance is measured is by utilizing earned value management (EVM). Earned value 
management is a tool that the government can use to help identify concerns and estimate 
the cost and completion date as a result of issues (Rendon & Snider, 2008).  
b. Contract Modifications  
Contract modifications are changes that are made after both parties sign the 
contract. FAR 43.103 discusses two types of contract modification changes, which are 
bilateral and unilateral. Bilateral modifications must be signed by both parties and are 
used to negotiate equitable adjustments, definitize letter contracts, and modify the terms 
of a contract. Unilateral modifications are signed only by the government and consist of 
administrative changes, changes in orders, changes authorized other than change clauses, 
and termination of notices (FAR 43.103, 2015).  
c. Payment and Invoices  
Payments are made to the contractor over the course of work being completed, 
and the invoices are submitted to the government for supplies and services provided. 
Payments can be made in a single lump sum payment for performance, as in a fixed-
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priced contract, or spread throughout the course of the contract, as in a cost-
reimbursement contract (Rendon & Snider, 2008). The Material Inspection and Receiving 
Report (MIRR) or DD250 is the document that the government requires for invoice 
acceptance. The contractor can physically submit it or electronically file it using the Wide 
Area Workflow (WAWF; DFARS 252.232-7003, 2015). These physical and electronic 
documents are used to give the government a tool to authenticate the submission and pay 
the contractor. The COR is the primary member in this process who acknowledges the 
delivery of supplies or services and certifies their condition.  
6. Contract Closeout  
Contract closeout is a part of the post-award phase and comes after the 
completion of the contract administration process. In the contract closeout process, the 
government validates that all administrative matters are concluded in the contract. 
Government contracts must eventually be closed out and this happens in one of three 
ways: successful completion, termination for convenience by the government, and 
termination for default.     
a. Successful Completion  
The contract closeout process occurs when the contract is a “physically completed 
contract,” meaning that all supplies and services have been received, all significant issues 
have been addressed, all costs have been paid for, and all audits have been resolved (FAR 
4.804, 2015). Once all these steps have been verified, the contracting officer can initiate 
the closeout process and store or retain the files for one to six years depending on the 
content of the contract and in compliance with FAR 4.805(a)(b). At this point, any 
remaining money on the contract can be de-obligated by the government and returned to 
the proper agency (FAR 43.103-5, 2015).  
b. Termination 
Contracts that are terminated before their completion date are either terminated 
for convenience (T4C) by the government or terminated for default (T4D). A termination 
for convenience by the government is usually due to the organization's requirements, 
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budget issues, or technology issues. In this case, the government pays the contractor for 
cost incurred, work completed, or goods delivered and documents the file that the 
contractor’s performance was satisfactory. A termination for default by the government is 
usually due to the contractor’s inability to perform services or failure to deliver supplies 
or services in accordance with the contract. A termination for default may reflect 
negatively on the contractor and will be recorded in the government past performance 
measurement systems. FAR Part 49 describes the penalties that a contractor may incur in 
a T4D, which include negative information recorded in past performance records, 
financial withholdings, liquidated damages, and increased construction bond premiums 
(FAR 49.4, 2015).  
Contracts will be successful when they are managed by competent, capable, and 
trained people that pay dutiful attention to the contract management processes. The 
contract management process can only be successful if the organization emphasizes 
strong internal controls. The next section provides a thorough explanation of the internal 
control components.  
F. INTERNAL CONTROL COMPONENTS 
The federal government is frequently looking for ways to improve accountability 
to achieve an organization’s mission. To improve accountability, the organization must 
implement an effective internal control system (Government Accountability Office, 
2014). In the DOD procurement environment, effective internal controls are required by 
system and business process managers in procurement in order to improve accountability, 
transparency, traceability, and data integrity (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
The concepts of internal control under the COSO are widely used in the world, 
and the federal government adapts these concepts for use in government. COSO 
published the Internal Control-Integrated Framework (COSO, 2013), which defines 
internal control as “a process effected by an entity’s board of directors, management, and 
other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of 
objectives relating to operations, reporting, and compliance” (COSO, 2013, p. 3). COSO 
also provides the objectives of internal control, the five components of internal control, 
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and seventeen principles related to the five components. The concepts of the integrated 
framework of internal control are discussed in the following sections. 
1. Key Concepts of COSO’s Internal Control Framework 
The definition of COSO’s internal control encompasses fundamental concepts. 
These key concepts of internal control are as follows:  
• The accomplishment of objectives in internal control is in one or more 
categories: operations, reporting, and compliance (COSO, 2013).   
• Internal control is a process that includes the plans, methods, policies, and 
procedures used to accomplish the mission, strategic plan, goals, and 
objectives of the entity (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014). 
• Internal control requires a continuous effort, effected not only by policy, 
procedure, systems, and forms, but also by people at every level of an 
organization (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014). 
• An effective internal control system is able to provide reasonable 
assurance, but not absolute assurance, that the organization’s objectives 
will be met (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014). 
• Internal control is adaptable to an individual organization and should be 
flexible to fit the needs of the organization (COSO, 2013). 
2. Objectives of COSO’s Internal Control Framework 
COSO addresses three categories of objectives, which include operational 
objectives, reporting objectives, and compliance objectives. These objectives are distinct 
but have overlapping categories in each area (COSO, 2013).  
a. Operational Objectives  
Operational objectives result in greater efficiency and effectiveness in the 
organization’s operations (COSO, 2013). Operational objectives may be connected to a 
strategic plan. A strategic plan uses effective and efficient operations for an organization. 
Effective operations generate the expected outcomes by operational processes, while 
efficient operations generate expected outcomes by means of minimizing the waste of 
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resources (GAO, 2014). The effectiveness of internal control is determined by a 
commitment to integrity and ethical values.  Management is expected to establish values 
and expectations regarding proper behavior. Also, the tone at the top influences the 
effectiveness of internal control. An organization’s commitment to integrity and ethical 
values is included in its standards of conduct and is communicated through directives, 
actions, and behavior.  An organization also needs to establish processes to maintain 
standards of conduct, ensuring that deviations are identified and fixed in a timely and 
consistent manner (Whittington & Pany, 2014).        
b. Reporting Objectives  
Reporting objectives involve internal and external, and financial and non-financial 
report preparation for use within the organization or by its stakeholders. These objectives 
covers reliability, timeliness, transparency, or other terms as set forth by regulators, 
recognized standards, or the organization’s policies (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014).  
c. Compliance Objectives  
Compliance objectives relate to obeying the laws and regulations that an 
organization has to follow (COSO, 2013). In the government sector, objectives focus on 
compliance with applicable laws and regulations, which are important core values to their 
organization. Management should oversee compliance objectives for the organization to 
determine which controls are crucial to design, implement, and monitor for the 
organization to achieve its objectives effectively (GAO, 2014). Furthermore, the Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) provide guidance for better government agencies. 
3. Five COSO Internal Control Components 
The COSO provides five components designed to be executed in an integrated 
way (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014). The five internal components are described in the 
following sections.   
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a. Control Environment 
The COSO defines control environment as “the set of standards, processes, and 
structures that provide the basis for carrying out internal control across the organization” 
(COSO, 2013, p. 4). It can be viewed as the basis for the other components of internal 
control. This component influences the total quality of internal control by maintaining an 
environment through the organization that sets the attitude for ethical behavior within the 
organization (GAO, 2014). Principles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are associated with Control 
Environment, which will be discussed later (Figure 6).    
b. Risk Assessment 
An organization generally faces various risks from internal and external sources. 
According to the COSO, risk assessment is defined as “a dynamic and iterative process 
for identifying and assessing risks to the achievement of objectives” (COSO, 2013, p.4). 
Risk assessment should include determining how risks may be managed. In order to 
perform effective risk assessment, management should establish objectives for each level 
of the organization prior to risk assessment. Also, management should assess the risks 
facing the organization and identify objectives within operations, reporting, and 
compliance. Management should also consider the viability of the objectives for the 
organization. Moreover, management should consider possible changes in the internal 
and external environment that could impact the organization’s internal control 
effectiveness (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014).  Assessing risk consists of evaluating the 
likelihood of occurrence of risks and the potential impact of risks.  It also includes 
consideration of the number of occurrences and the duration of the impact of the risks. 
Through the risk assessment, management can identify significant risks that need to be 
addressed (Whittington & Pany, 2014). Principles 6, 7, 8, and 9 are associated with Risk 
Assessment, which will be discussed later (see Figure 6).    
c. Control Activities 
Control activities are “the actions established through policies and procedures that 
help ensure that management’s directives to mitigate risks to the achievement of 
objectives are carried out” (COSO, 2013, p. 4). Control activities are performed 
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throughout organizations at all levels and at various functions. Control activities may be 
preventive in nature or may be detective in nature. Control activities may also involve 
various manuals and actions required to check the accuracy, completeness, validity, and 
authorization of transactions. Also, segregation of duties is an effective means of control 
activities. If segregation of duties is not practical, management should select and develop 
alternative control activities to reduce the risk of fraud (COSO, 2013; GAO, 2014).  Also, 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which contains an implementation guide 
for the federal government, shows examples of control activities, such as proper 
segregation of duties, physical controls over assets, proper authorization, and appropriate 
documentation and access to that documentation (OMB, 2004). Principles 10, 11, and 12 
are associated with Control Activities, which will be discussed later (see Figure 6).    
d. Information and Communication  
Information is needed at various levels of an organization to support the internal 
control system. Effective information and communication are crucial for an organization 
to achieve its objectives (GAO, 2014). Proper communication helps people to understand 
their roles and responsibilities in the organization. Also, open communication networks 
are important to establish the proper functions of an information system. With proper 
communication, people can understand how their activities connect to the work of others 
(Whittington & Pany, 2014). Therefore, management should obtain relevant and quality 
information from internal as well as external sources for supporting the function of other 
internal control components.  Communication is the constant process of providing, 
sharing, and obtaining essential information (COSO, 2013). Principles 13, 14, and 15 are 
associated with Information and Communication, which will be discussed later (see 
Figure 6).    
e. Monitoring Activities 
Monitoring activities is “a process to assess the quality of internal control 
performance over time” (Whittington & Pany, 2014). Monitoring activities are crucial to 
making sure that internal controls remain effective through evolving objectives, 
environments, laws, resources, and risks. Separate monitoring evaluations are used to 
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assess the quality of internal controls. Ongoing evaluations are implemented into the 
operation processes at various levels of the organization and provide timely information. 
Separate evaluations are performed on a non-routine basis and support the assessment of 
risks and effectiveness of ongoing evaluations. The findings from monitoring activities 
are evaluated against the organization’s internal control policies and the deficiencies are 
communicated to management or a supervisor. Corrective actions are essential to control 
activities in order to accomplish the organization’s objectives (COSO, 2013; GAO, 
2014). Principles 16 and 17 are associated with Monitoring Activities, which will be 
discussed later (see Figure 6).                       
4. Fundamental Principles Supporting Internal Control Components 
As previously discussed, the 17 principles support the effective design, 
implementation, and operation of related components in order to establish an effective 
internal control system (GAO, 2014). Generally, all components and principles are 
relevant and integrated to establishing an effective internal control system. Figure 6 is a 
summary of the internal control framework from the discussion of COSO’s five internal 
control components and 17 principles (COSO, 2013; Tan, 2013). These principles are 
used to evaluate whether the five components are present and functioning effectively. 










Figure 6.  COSO’s 17 Fundamental Principles  
 
Source: Tan, L. H. J. (2013). An analysis of internal controls and procurement fraud 
deterrence (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School). Retrieved from 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/39022/13Dec_Tan_Li_Huang_Joyce.pdf?
sequence=1 
a. Principle 1: Demonstrates Integrity and Ethical Values  
The effectiveness of internal control is influenced by a commitment to integrity 
and ethical values as demonstrated by an oversight body and by management, through 
their directives, appropriate attitudes, and behavior. The oversight body and management 
need to demonstrate the organization’s values, philosophy, and operating style (GAO, 
2014). Setting a tone of integrity and ethical behavior at the top is essential for effective 
internal controls. Management also sets the standard of conduct by communicating their 
expectations of ethical values. An organization should establish procedures to evaluate its 
works against the organization’s anticipated standard of conduct and to ensure that 
deviations are dealt with on a timely basis (GAO, 2014). 
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b. Principle 2: Exercises Oversight Responsibility 
The oversight body, such as the board of directors and audit committee, should be 
independent from management and appropriately oversee the organization’s development 
and implementation of internal controls. In selecting members for an oversight body, it is 
important to consider the skills, knowledge, relevant expertise, number of members, and 
possible independence required to meet the oversight responsibilities. The oversight body 
should provide input for remediation of deficiencies so that the organization has guidance 
for correcting these deficiencies (Whittington & Pany, 2014; GAO, 2014). 
c. Principle 3: Establishes Structure, Authority, and Responsibility 
Management should establish an organizational structure, delegate authority, and 
assign responsibility to accomplish the organization’s objectives. Well-designed 
organizational structures provide a foundation that enables the entity to plan, direct, 
control, and assess operations. Personnel in an organization need to know their 
responsibilities and the organization’s rules and regulations. Hence, management should 
develop descriptions of its internal control system and clearly define authority and 
responsibility in the organization so that they can improve the control environment. Also, 
establishing documentation with regards to policies may foster appropriate business 
operation practices (Whittington & Pany, 2014; GAO, 2014). 
d. Principle 4: Demonstrates Commitment to Competence 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of internal controls is influenced by the 
characteristics of an individual organization (Whittington & Pany, 2014). Therefore, 
management should establish expectations of competence for important roles to support 
achieving the organization’s objectives. Management’s policies and practices for 
recruiting, developing, and retaining competent personnel have a significant effect on 
achieving the organization’s objectives. For example, management could describe the 
organization’s commitment to hiring competent and trustworthy people through 
establishing standards for hiring competent individuals who have the necessary education, 
experience, and certification (GAO, 2014). 
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e. Principle 5: Enforces Accountability 
The organization needs to assess performance and hold individuals within the 
organization accountable. Accountability is determined by management’s tone at the top, 
commitment to principles of integrity and ethical values, establishment of organizational 
structure, and expectations of competence. Management should hold individuals 
accountable for performing their internal control responsibilities. Also, the oversight 
body, such as the board of directors and audit committee, should hold management 
accountable as a whole for its internal control responsibilities (GAO, 2014). 
f. Principle 6: Specifies Suitable Objectives 
Management should define specific and measurable objectives to enable the 
identification of risks and define risk tolerances. Clearly defining objectives can improve 
an organization’s progress toward achieving the organization’s objectives. Defining risk 
tolerances are important performance measures that are suitable for the design of an 
internal control system (GAO, 2014). 
g. Principle 7: Identifies and Analyzes Risk 
Management should identify, analyze risks, and then react to those risks 
connected with accomplishing the organization’s objectives. Risk assessment is “the 
identification and analysis of risks” (GAO, 2014, p. 37) associated with accomplishing 
the defined goals in order to form a foundation for planning risk responses (GAO, 2014). 
h. Principle 8: Assesses Fraud Risk 
Management should take fraud into account when identifying, analyzing, and 
responding to other risks. Considering the types of fraud or misconduct, such as waste 
and abuse, can provide a basis for identifying fraud risks. Also, fraud risk factors, such as 
incentive, pressure, opportunity, or rationalization should be considered. Moreover, 
management should analyze and respond to potential identified fraud risks in order to 
mitigate possible problems effectively (GAO, 2014). 
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i. Principle 9: Identifies and Analyzes Significant Change 
Management should identify, analyze, and respond to developments and shifts 
that have the potential to influence the internal control system. Significant changes that 
may be critical to an effective internal control are frequently overlooked. Also, analyzing 
the effect of identified changes and revising the internal control system in a timely 
manner is crucial to maintaining its effectiveness (GAO, 2014). 
j. Principle 10: Selects and Develops Control Activities 
Management should design control activities for achieving objectives and 
responding to risks. Control activities will help management in fulfilling its 
responsibilities to properly respond to identified risks in the internal control system. Also, 
designing control activities at various levels in the organization is important to meeting 
the organization’s objectives and addressing related risks. Furthermore, segregating 
duties in designing control activities is crucial for appropriate internal control (GAO, 
2014). 
k. Principle 11: Selects and Develops General Control Over Technology 
Management should consider designing the organization’s information system 
and associated control activities so that they can accomplish objectives and respond to 
risks.  Information systems have the two forms of control activities.  One is a general 
control activity.  Another is an application control activity. General control activities are 
the policies, guidance, and procedures applying to entirely or a large part of the 
information system. On the other hand, application control activities are directly 
integrated into applications of computers to accomplish validity, comprehensiveness, 
accurateness, and secrecy of data and transactions during process of application (GAO, 
2014).  
l. Principle 12: Deploys through Policies and Procedures 
Management needs to implement control activities through policies and 
procedures. It is important to document the policies and objectives for each area of 
responsibility in their organization. Each area determines the policies related to the 
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objectives and risks for the operational process. Management should periodically review 
policies and procedures to maintain relevant and effective functions in achieving the 
organization’s objectives or finding related risks (GAO, 2014). 
m. Principle 13: Uses Relevant Information 
Management needs to use relevant information to achieve the organization’s 
objectives. Considering information requirements is important for both internal and 
external users.  Therefore, it is crucial to identify information requirements with the 
processes of an effective internal control. When obtaining data, management should be 
concerned about the reliability of the information. Management needs to assess both 
internal and external sources of data for reliability so that these data can be used for 
effective monitoring (GAO, 2014).  
n. Principle 14: Communicates Internally 
It is important for management to communicate internally with the necessary 
quality information to achieve the organization’s objectives. Quality information should 
be interconnected toward up, down, around, and across lines of reporting to entire levels 
of the organization.  Management should communicate throughout the organization to 
enable individuals to perform necessary roles in accomplishing objectives, addressing 
risks, and having an effective internal control system. Also, management should select 
appropriate methods to communicate internally, such as written documents and face-to-
face meetings so that individuals can communicate appropriate information (GAO, 2014). 
o. Principle 15: Communicates Externally 
It is also important for management to communicate externally with the necessary 
quality information to achieve the organization’s objectives. Management should obtain 
quality information from external organization by using created lines of reporting. 
Reporting lines enable management to help external parties achieve the organization’s 
objectives and address the related risks. Also, management should select appropriate 
methods to communicate externally, such as written documents and face-to-face meetings 
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so that the organization will be able to obtain the appropriate methods to communicate 
appropriate and quality information timely (GAO, 2014). 
p. Principle 16: Conducts Ongoing and/or Separate Evaluations 
Management should establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the 
internal control system and evaluate the results. To identify the issues and deficiencies, 
management should establish a baseline for monitoring and evaluating the internal 
control system. Also, it is important to conduct monitoring through ongoing assessments 
of the design and operating effectiveness of internal controls with separate evaluations. 
Ongoing monitoring should be a part of the organization’s operations, should be 
performed constantly, and should be responsive to changing situations. Separate 
evaluations conducted periodically can deliver feedback on the effective constant 
monitoring. Management should assess and make documents of the results of both 
separate evaluations and constant monitoring in order to recognize the issues within the 
internal control system (GAO, 2014). 
q. Principle 17: Evaluates and Communicates Deficiencies 
Management needs to remediate identified deficiencies of internal control in a 
timely manner. In order to remediate the deficiencies, individuals should report internal 
control issues when they identify the issues while performing their duties. Also, 
management should assess and publish the document of the internal control problems and 
decide to conduct proper correction for internal control deficiencies   Moreover, 
management should make appropriate correction to amend the internal control 
deficiencies timely (GAO, 2014). 
G. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, a review of the literature related to the DOD contracting 
environment and current problems and DOD initiatives in response to the current 
problems were discussed. Next, the importance of the auditability theory along with 
auditability triangle was addressed. In addition, the six processes of the contract 
management were discussed. These phases provide the guidelines for the personnel that 
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serve in contracting organizations to conduct procurement of public goods and services in 
a cost-effective and efficient way. Finally, the five COSO internal control components 
and the associated 17 principles were addressed. An effective internal control system 
needs each of the five components and related principles to exist and function in an 
integrated manner. The next chapter, Chapter III, includes a discussion of the 





















This chapter discusses the methodology used in this research. First, the source of 
data collected is discussed. Then, the development of the assessment tool is provided. 
Finally, a discussion of how the data was analyzed is provided.  
B. SOURCE OF DATA COLLECTED 
The data collected came from the Department of Defense Inspector General 
(DODIG) audit reports related to the DOD’s acquisition and contract administration. The 
DODIG is an independent agency that advises the Secretary of Defense and Congress by 
providing relevant and timely oversight of the DOD and reports to the public. In addition, 
the DODIG supports the warfighter by promoting accountability, integrity, and efficiency 
(DODIG, n.d.). 
The data used in this research was collected from the DODIG’s (2009) Summary 
of DOD Office of Inspector General Audits of Acquisition and Contract Administration, 
which consisted of 128 reports from FY 2003 to FY 2008 and 21 individual audit reports 
of acquisition processes and contract management from FY 2009 to FY 2010. The 
DODIG reports and publications are located at www.dodig.mil. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF ASSESSMENT TOOL 
An excel spreadsheet was created as an assessment tool to facilitate the analysis 
of the DODIG reports. This assessment tool was used to analyze the DODIG reported 
deficiencies concerning contract management processes and assess the internal control 
components. The assessment tool was used to categorize several factors in each report to 
find areas of concern. Then the descriptive data was broken down into categories of 
deficiencies to assess the internal controls within contract management processes. The 
assessment tool consists of the report numbers, type of DOD service department, contract 
management processes, and internal control components. The results are displayed in a 
graph and table outlay.   
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D. DATA ANALYSIS 
The results of each DOD contract management deficiency were analyzed 
according to the contract management processes and internal control components. The 
assessment tool reflected the contract management processes and internal control 
components associated with each DODIG reported deficiency.  These results were then 
analyzed for patterns and differences. The implications of the results were used to 
develop recommendations to help influence changes in DOD contract management 
processes and internal controls.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the methodology for this research, discussed the source of 
the data, described the development of the assessment tool, and explained how the data 
was analyzed. The next chapter, Chapter IV, provides the research findings, the analysis 
of the findings, the implications of the findings, and recommendations for the DOD on 














IV. FINDINGS, IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the findings, implications, and recommendations 
resulting from the analysis of this research. The findings will be reviewed in regards to 
the results of the analysis conducted on DODIG reports. Specifically addressed will be 
the number of deficiencies within the contract management processes and weaknesses 
within the internal control components of the DOD. Next, the implications of these 
findings based on this analysis of contract management processes deficiencies and 
internal control components weaknesses will be discussed. Finally, recommendations will 
be made based on the implications of these findings of contract management process 
deficiencies and internal control components weaknesses.  
B. FINDINGS 
The DODIG report identified several DOD deficiencies and weaknesses in each 
individual report. Therefore, each stated deficiency or weakness was counted separately 
to develop an analytical presentation of the breakdown of deficiencies and weaknesses in 
order to help make recommendations to the DOD. The following Tables and Figures 
reflect the results of the analysis of 149 DODIG reports between 2003 and 2010. The 
numbers of DODIG reports analyzed were 38 in Army, 37 in Air Force, 18 in Navy, 3 in 
Joint, 53 in DOD, respectively (DODIG, 2009). 
1. Contract Management Processes Deficiencies   
The deficiencies of the contract management processes were identified using 149 
DODIG reports from 2003 to 2010. Table 1 shows the results of the analysis of these 
reports presented by the number of deficiencies found in the six contract management 
processes by DOD service departments. The analysis of the DODIG reports were 
categorized by Army, Air Force, Navy, Joint, DOD Other Agencies, and Overall, as 
shown in Table 1. It should also be noted that only three DODIG reports referred to a 
joint service department when reviewing the overall data. Therefore the joint service 
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department was not included in the write up. Also, the DOD Other Agencies comprises 
organizations run mostly by civilian DOD personnel, sometimes with a few military 
members from other departments, but not enough to identify them as a joint department.  



























































1 Procurement Planning  
PP-1 Requirements Analysis 15 5 4 1 3 28 
PP-2 Required Sources of Supply and Services 4 1 0 0 5 10 
PP-3 Acquisition Planning 12 15 10 2 17 56 
PP-4 Market Research 1 5 1 0 7 14 
PP-5 Determine Competition Environment 4 4 2 0 11 21 
 Sub Total of Procurement Planning 36 30 17 3 43 129 
2 Solicitation Planning  
SP-1 Document Competition Environment 0 0 0 0 1 1 
SP-2 Determine Procurement Method 2 3 3 0 4 12 
SP-3 Determine Evaluation Strategy 3 7 2 0 8 20 
SP-4 Develop Solicitation Documents 6 2 1 0 2 11 
SP-5 Determine Contract Type/ Incentive 7 9 5 1 11 33 
SP-6 Determine Terms and Conditions 0 3 0 0 3 6 
 Sub Total of Solicitation Planning 18 24 11 1 29 83 
3 Solicitation  
S-1 Advertise Procurement Activities 0 2 0 0 1 3 
S-2 Conduct Conference 1 1 0 0 0 2 
S-3 Amend solicitation documents as required 1 4 0 0 2 7 
 Sub Total of Solicitation 2 7 0 0 3 12 
4 Source Selection  
SS-1 Evaluate Proposals 2 6 1 0 3 12 
SS -2 Apply Evaluation Criteria 3 7 1 0 4 15 
SS -3 Negotiate Contract Terms and Conditions 4 8 2 0 11 25 
SS -4 Contractor Responsibility Standards 2 4 1 0 5 12 
SS -5 Select contractor Manage Protests, Disputes and Appeals 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SS -6 Manage Protests, Disputes and Appeals 0 0 0 0 0 0 



























































5 Contract Administration   
CA-1 Conduct conferences 1 0 0 0 2 3 
CA-2 Manage contract change process 3 3 1 0 3 10 
CA-3 Monitor contractor's management of subcontracting 1 2 2 0 1 6 
CA-4 Manage government furnished property 3 1 0 1 2 7 
CA-5 Monitor and measure contractor performance 13 11 9 0 17 50 
CA-6 Manage Transportation Issues 1 0 0 0 0 1 
CA-7 Manage Value Engineering Issues 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA-8 Manage contractor payment process 8 7 5 2 15 37 
CA-9 Manage patents, data, copyright, bonds, insurance, taxes 0 0 0 0 1 1 
CA-10 Manage Protests, Disputes and Appeals 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CA-11 Comply with terms and conditions 7 18 6 2 17 50 
 Sub Total of Contract Administration 37 42 23 5 58 165 
6 Contract Closeout  
CCO-1 Verify contract completion 0 2 0 0 1 3 
CCO-2 Verify contractor compliance 2 1 1 0 1 5 
CCO-3 Ensure contract completion documentation 1 0 0 0 0 1 
CCO-4 Make final payment 0 0 0 0 2 2 
CCO-5 Document lessons learned/ best practices 0 0 0 0 1 1 
CCO-6 Process contract terminations, if applicable 1 0 0 0 1 2 
CCO-7 Dispose of buyer-furnished property and equipment 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CCO-8 Process contract closeout procedures 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Sub Total of Contract Closeout 4 3 1 0 6 14 
 TOTAL OF ALL DEFICIENCIES 108 131 57 9 162 467 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm  
Table 1 presents the number of deficiencies that were identified after analysis of 
the DODIG reports. The deficiencies occurred within the key process areas of 
Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract 
Administration, and Contract Closeout. The deficiencies within each of the key process 
areas occurred 129 times in Procurement Planning, 83 times in Solicitation Planning, 12 
times in Solicitation, 64 times in Source Selection, 165 times in Contract Administration, 
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14 times in Contract Closeout. The highest deficiencies were in Contract Administration 
(165), Procurement Planning (129), and Solicitation Planning (83).  
The highest deficiencies that occurred within each key practice activity was 56 
times in Acquisition planning (PP-3), 50 times in Monitor and measure contractor 
performance (CA-5), 50 times in Comply with terms and conditions (CA-11), 37 times in 
Manage contractor payment process (CA-8), and 33 times in Determine Contract Type/ 
Incentive (SP-5). Table 2 presents the number of deficiencies by service department 
shown as percentages that were identified based on analysis of the DODIG reports. 
Table 2.   Contract Management Processes Number of Deficiencies Shown 


























































1 Procurement Planning       
PP-1 Requirements Analysis 13.9% 3.8% 7.0% 11.1% 1.9% 6.0% 
PP-2 Required Sources of Supply and Services 3.7% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 2.1% 
PP-3 Acquisition Planning 11.1% 11.5% 17.5% 22.2% 10.5% 12.0% 
PP-4 Market Research 0.9% 3.8% 1.8% 0.0% 4.3% 3.0% 
PP-5 Determine Competition Environment 3.7% 3.1% 3.5% 0.0% 6.8% 4.5% 
 Sub Total of Procurement Planning 33.3% 22.9% 29.8% 33.3% 26.5% 27.6% 
2 Solicitation Planning  
SP-1 Document Competition Environment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.2% 
SP-2 Determine Procurement Method 1.9% 2.3% 5.3% 0.0% 2.5% 2.6% 
SP-3 Determine Evaluation Strategy 2.8% 5.3% 3.5% 0.0% 4.9% 4.3% 
SP-4 Develop Solicitation Documents 5.6% 1.5% 1.8% 0.0% 1.2% 2.4% 
SP-5 Determine Contract Type/ Incentive 6.5% 6.9% 8.8% 11.1% 6.8% 7.1% 
SP-6 Determine Terms and Conditions 0.0% 2.3% 0.0% 0.0% 1.9% 1.3% 
 Sub Total of Solicitation Planning 16.7% 18.3% 19.3% 11.1% 17.9% 17.8% 
3 Solicitation  
S-1 Advertise Procurement Activities 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 
S-2 Conduct Conference 0.9% 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
S-3 Amend solicitation documents as required 0.9% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 1.5% 



























































4 Source Selection  
SS-1 Evaluate Proposals 1.9% 4.6% 1.8% 0.0% 1.9% 2.6% 
SS -2 Apply Evaluation Criteria 2.8% 5.3% 1.8% 0.0% 2.5% 3.2% 
SS -3 Negotiate Contract Terms and Conditions 3.7% 6.1% 3.5% 0.0% 6.8% 5.4% 
SS -4 Contractor Responsibility Standards 1.9% 3.1% 1.8% 0.0% 3.1% 2.6% 
SS -5 Select contractor Manage Protests, Disputes and 
Appeals 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
SS -6 Manage Protests, Disputes and Appeals 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Sub Total of Source Selection 10.2% 19.1% 8.8% 0.0% 14.2% 13.7% 
5 Contract Administration   
CA-1 Conduct conferences 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.6% 
CA-2 Manage contract change process 2.8% 2.3% 1.8% 0.0% 1.9% 2.1% 
CA-3 Monitor contractor's management of subcontracting 0.9% 1.5% 3.5% 0.0% 0.6% 1.3% 
CA-4 Manage government furnished property 2.8% 0.8% 0.0% 11.1% 1.2% 1.5% 
CA-5 Monitor and measure contractor performance 12.0% 8.4% 15.8% 0.0% 10.5% 10.7% 
CA-6 Manage Transportation Issues 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
CA-7 Manage Value Engineering Issues 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CA-8 Manage contractor payment process 7.4% 5.3% 8.8% 22.2% 9.3% 7.9% 
CA-9 Manage patents, data, copyright, bonds, insurance, 
taxes 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.2% 
CA-10 Manage Protests, Disputes and Appeals 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CA-11 Comply with terms and conditions 6.5% 13.7% 10.5% 22.2% 10.5% 10.7% 
 Sub Total of Contract Administration 34.3% 32.1% 40.4% 55.6% 35.8% 35.3% 
6 Contract Closeout  
CCO-1 Verify contract completion 0.0% 1.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 
CCO-2 Verify contractor compliance 1.9% 0.8% 1.8% 0.0% 0.6% 1.1% 
CCO-3 Ensure contract completion documentation 0.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 
CCO-4 Make final payment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.2% 0.4% 
CCO-5 Document lessons learned/ best practices 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.2% 
CCO-6 Process contract terminations, if applicable 0.8% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.4% 
CCO-7 Dispose of buyer-furnished property and equipment 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
CCO-8 Process contract closeout procedures 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Sub Total of Contract Closeout 3.7% 2.3% 1.8% 0.0% 3.7% 3.0% 
 TOTAL OF ALL DEFICIENCIES 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
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Overall, the deficiencies occurred within the key process areas of Procurement 
Planning, Solicitation Planning, Solicitation, Source Selection, Contract Administration, 
and Contract Closeout. Overall, the deficiencies that occurred within each key process 
area are 27.6% in Procurement Planning, 17.8% in Solicitation Planning, 2.6% in 
Solicitation, 13.7% in Source Selection, 35.3% in Contract Administration, and 3.0% in 
Contract Closeout. Overall, the analysis among services indicated the highest percentages 
of deficiencies that occurred within each key process areas were in Contract 
Administration (35.3%), Procurement Planning (27.6%), and Solicitation Planning 
(17.8%). 
When analyzed by service department and by key process areas, of the total Army 
deficiencies, 34.3% were identified in Contract Administration, 33.3% were identified in 
Procurement Planning, and 16.7% were identified in Solicitation Planning (Table 2). Of 
the total Air Force deficiencies, 32.1% were identified in Contract Administration, 22.9% 
were identified in Procurement Planning, and 19.1% were identified in Source Selection 
(Table 2). Of the total Navy deficiencies, 40.4% were identified in Contract 
Administration, 33.3% were identified in Procurement Planning, and 19.3% were 
identified in Solicitation Planning (Table 2). Of the total DOD Other Agencies 
deficiencies, 35.8% were identified in Contract Administration, 26.5% were identified in 
Procurement Planning, and 17.9% were identified in Solicitation Planning (Table 2). 
As Figure 7 shows, overall, the most frequently occurring deficiencies in the 
contract management processes were identified in Contract Administration (CA) (35.3%). 
The second most frequently occurring deficiencies were identified in Procurement 
Planning (PP) (27.6%). The third most frequently occurring deficiencies were identified 
in Solicitation Planning (SP) (17.8%).  
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Figure 7.  Overall Contract Management Processes Percentages of Frequency 
of Deficiencies 
 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
As Figure 8 shows, when analyzed by Key Practice Activities and all the service 
departments, overall, similar frequencies of deficiencies were found in these Key Practice 
Activities: Acquisition Planning (PP-3), Monitor and measure contractor performance 
(CA-5), Comply with terms and conditions (CA-11), and Determine Contract 
Type/Incentive (SP-5). The most frequently occurring deficiencies in the contract 
management processes were observed during: Procurement Planning in Acquisition 
Planning (PP-3) (12.0%), Contract Administration in Monitor and measure contractor 
performance (CA-5) (10.7%), Comply with terms and conditions (CA-11) (10.7%), 
Contract Administration in Manage contractor payment price (CA-8) (7.9%), and 
Solicitation Planning in Determine Contract Type/Incentive (SP-5) (7.1%). 
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Figure 8.  Overall Contract Management Key Practice Activities Percentages 
of Frequency of Deficiencies 
 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
When analyzed by service department and by Key Process Activities, of the total 
Navy deficiencies, 17.5% were identified in Acquisition Planning (PP-3), 15.8% were 
identified in Monitor and measure contractor performance (CA-5), and 8.8% were 
identified in Determine Contract Type/ Incentive (SP-5) (Figure 9). Of the total Army 
deficiencies, 13.9% were identified in Requirements Analysis (PP-1), and 5.6% were 
identified in Develop Solicitation Documents (SP-4)  (Figure 9). Of the total Air Force 
deficiencies, 13.7% were identified in Comply with terms and conditions (CA-11), and 
5.3% were identified in Determine Evaluation Strategy (SP-3) (Figure 9). Of the total 
DOD Other Agencies deficiencies, 9.3% were identified in Contract Administration in 
Manage contractor payment price (CA-8), and 6.8% were identified in Market Research 
(PP-5) (Figure 9).  
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Figure 9.  Contract Management Key Practice Activities Percentages of 
Frequency of Deficiencies by DOD Departments 
 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
2. Internal Controls Weaknesses 
The DODIG reported contracting deficiencies were also analyzed in terms of 
internal control components. Table 3 shows the results of the analysis of the reports 
presented by number of weaknesses in terms of the five components of internal control 
and related 17 principles by DOD service department. Overall, Table 3, which lists 17 
principles, as stated by GAO (2014, p. 9), shows that the frequently occurring weakness 
areas of internal control components were in Control Environment, Control Activities, 
and Risk Assessment. 
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 Control Environment  
CE-1 The oversight body and management should demonstrate a commitment to 
integrity and ethical values. 0 1 0 0 0 1 
CE-2 The oversight body should oversee the entity’s internal control system. 13 12 4 2 16 47 
CE-3 Management should establish an organizational structure, assign responsibility, 
and delegate authority to achieve the entity’s objectives. 15 14 9 1 22 61 
CE-4 Management should demonstrate a commitment to recruit, develop, and retain 
competent individuals. 4 5 4 0 5 18 
CE-5 Management should evaluate performance and hold individuals accountable 
for their internal control responsibilities. 1 1 2 0 1 5 
 Sub Total of Control Environment  32 32 19 3 44 132 
 Risk Assessment  
RA-1 Management should define objectives clearly to enable the identification of 
risks and define risk tolerances. 0 0 0 0 1 1 
RA-2 Management should identify, analyze, and respond to risks related to achieving 
the defined objectives. 7 8 7 0 13 35 
RA-3 Management should consider the potential for fraud when identifying, 
analyzing, and responding to risks. 2 5 0 0 3 10 
RA-4 Management should identify, analyze, and respond to significant changes that 
could impact the internal control system. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Sub Total of Risk Assessment  9 13 7 0 17 46 
 Control Activities  
CA-1 Management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond 
to risks. 1 0 0 0 0 1 
CA-2 Management should design the entity’s information system and related control 
activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks.  2 0 0 2 4 
CA-3 Management should implement control activities through policies 13 13 6 2 22 56 
 Sub Total of Control Activities  14 15 6 2 24 61 
 Information and Communication  
IC-1 Management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
IC-2 Management should use quality information to achieve the entity’s objectives. 4 1 0 0 2 7 
IC-3 Management should externally communicate the necessary quality information 
to achieve the entity’s objectives. 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 Sub Total of Information and Communication  4 1 0 0 2 7 
 Monitoring Activity  
MA-1 Management should establish and operate monitoring activities to monitor the 
internal control system and evaluate the results. 4 1 1 0 2 8 
MA-2 Management should remediate identified internal control deficiencies on a 
timely basis. 0 0 0 0 1 1 
 Sub Total of Monitoring Activity 4 1 1 0 3 9 
 TOTAL OF ALL WEAKNESSES 63 62 33 5 90 253 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
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Overall, Table 3 shows the frequencies of the weaknesses of Internal Control 
Components and 17 principles by service departments.  As Table 3 shows, the frequency 
of the weaknesses of the overall DOD departments in each Internal Control component 
was as follows: 132 times in Control Environment, 46 times in Risk Assessment, 61 
times in Control Activities, 7 times in Information and Communication, and 9 times in 
Monitoring Activities. The highest weaknesses that occurred within the internal control 
components were in Control Environment (132), Control Activities (61), and Risk 
Assessment (46).  Also, the highest weaknesses that occurred within each internal control 
principle were 61 times in Establishes structure, authority, and responsibility (CE-3), 56 
times in Deploys through policies and procedures (CA-3), 47 times in Exercises oversight 
responsibility (CE-2), and 35 times in Identifies and analyzes risk (RA-2). 
The analysis using percentages better explains the frequency of weakness area for 
each DOD department. Table 4, which lists 17 principles, as stated by GAO (2014, p. 9), 
shows the results of the analysis of the DODIG reports as percentages of internal control 
weaknesses to the number of reports for each individual service department. As Table 4 
shows, the percentage of the highest weaknesses that occurred within the internal control 
components were 51.8% in Control Environment, 23.9% in Control Activity, and 18.0% 
in Risk Assessment. Also, based on the analysis, the percentages of the highest 
weaknesses that occurred within each internal control principle were 23.9% in 
Establishes structure, authority, and responsibility (CE-3), 22.0% in Deploys through 
policies and procedures (CA-3), 18.4% in Exercises oversight responsibility (CE-2), and 
13.7% in Identifies and analyzes risk (RA-2). 
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 Control Environment  
CE-1 
The oversight body and management should 
demonstrate a commitment to integrity and ethical 
values. 
0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
CE-2 The oversight body should oversee the entity’s 
internal control system. 
20.3% 19.0% 12.1% 40.0% 17.8% 18.4% 
CE-3 
Management should establish an organizational 
structure, assign responsibility, and delegate 
authority to achieve the entity’s objectives. 
23.4% 22.2% 27.3% 20.0% 24.4% 23.9% 
CE-4 Management should demonstrate a commitment to 
recruit, develop, and retain competent individuals. 
6.3% 7.9% 12.1% 0.0% 5.6% 7.1% 
CE-5 
Management should evaluate performance and hold 
individuals accountable for their internal control 
responsibilities. 
1.6% 1.6% 6.1% 0.0% 1.1% 2.0% 
 Sub Total of Control Environment  51.6% 52.4% 57.6% 60.0% 48.9% 51.8% 
 Risk Assessment  
RA-1 
Management should define objectives clearly to 
enable the identification of risks and define risk 
tolerances. 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.4% 
RA-2 Management should identify, analyze, and respond 
to risks related to achieving the defined objectives. 
10.9% 12.7% 21.2% 0.0% 14.4% 13.7% 
RA-3 
Management should consider the potential for fraud 
when identifying, analyzing, and responding to 
risks. 
3.1% 7.9% 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 3.9% 
RA-4 
Management should identify, analyze, and respond 
to significant changes that could impact the internal 
control system. 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Sub Total of Risk Assessment  14.1% 20.6% 21.2% 0.0% 18.9% 18.0% 
 Control Activity  
CA-1 Management should design control activities to 
achieve objectives and respond to risks. 
1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.4% 
CA-2 
Management should design the entity’s information 
system and related control activities to achieve 
objectives and respond to risks. 
0.0% 3.2% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 1.6% 
CA-3 Management should implement control activities 
through policies 
20.3% 20.6% 18.2% 40.0% 24.4% 22.0% 
 Sub Total of Control Activities  21.9% 23.8% 18.2% 40.0% 26.7% 23.9% 
 Information and Communication  
IC-1 Management should use quality information to 
achieve the entity’s objectives. 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
IC-2 Management should use quality information to 
achieve the entity’s objectives. 
6.3% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 2.7% 
IC-3 
Management should externally communicate the 
necessary quality information to achieve the 
entity’s objectives. 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
 Sub Total of Information and Communication  6.3% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 2.7% 






















































 Monitoring Activity  
MA-1 
Management should establish and operate 
monitoring activities to monitor the internal control 
system and evaluate the results. 
6.3% 1.6% 0.0% 0.0% 2.2% 2.7% 
MA-2 Management should remediate identified internal 
control deficiencies on a timely basis. 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 0.4% 
 Sub Total of Monitoring Activity 6.3% 1.6% 3.0% 0.0% 3.3% 3.5% 
 TOTAL OF ALL WEAKNESSES 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
When analyzed by service departments and internal control principles, of the total 
Army weaknesses, 51.6% were identified in Control Environment, 21.9% were identified 
in Control Activities, and 14.1% in Risk Assessment (Table 4). Of the total Air Force 
weaknesses, 52.4% were identified in Control Environment, 23.8% were identified in 
Control Activities, and 20.6% were identified in Risk Assessment (Table 4). Of the total 
Navy weaknesses, 57.6% were identified in Control Environment, 21.2% were identified 
in Risk Assessment, and 18.2% were identified in Control Activities (Table 4). Of the 
total DOD Others Agencies, 48.9% were identified in Control Environment, 26.7% in 
Control Activities, and 18.9% in Risk Assessment (Table 4). A graph format better 
reveals the dominant frequencies in weaknesses for the DOD IG reports as shown in 
Figures 10, 11, and 12. 
As Figure 10 shows, overall, the most frequently occurring weakness in the five 
internal control components were found in Control Environment (CE) (51.8%). The 
second most frequently occurring weaknesses were found in Control Activities (CA) 
(23.9%), and the third most frequently were found in Risk Assessment (RA) (18.0%). 
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Figure 10.  Overall Internal Control Components Percentages of Frequency of 
Weaknesses 
 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
As Figure 11 shows, overall, the most frequently occurring weakness in the 17 
principles was found in Establishes structure, authority, and responsibility (CE-3) 
(23.9%). The second most frequently occurring weaknesses were found in Deploys 
through policies and procedures (CA-3) (22.0%). The third most frequently occurring 
weaknesses were found in Exercises oversight responsibility (CE-2) (18.4%). 
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Figure 11.  Overall Internal Control Components and Related 17 Principles 
Percentages of Frequency of Weaknesses 
 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
When analyzed by service departments and internal control principles, of the total 
Army weaknesses, 23.4% were identified in Establishes structure, authority, and 
responsibility (CE-3), 20.3% were identified in Exercises oversight responsibility (CE-2), 
and 20.3% in Deploys through policies and procedures (CA-3) (Figure 12). Of the total 
Air Force weaknesses, 22.2% were identified in Establishes structure, authority, and 
responsibility (CE-3), 20.6% were identified in Deploys through policies and procedures 
(CA-3), and 19.0% were identified in Exercises oversight responsibility (CE-2) (Figure 
12). Of the total Navy weaknesses, 27.3% were identified in Establishes structure, 
authority, and responsibility (CE-3), 21.2% were identified in Identifies and analyzes risk 
(RA-2), and 18.2% were identified in Deploys through policies and procedures (CA-3) 
(Figure 12). Of the total DOD Others Agencies, 24.4% were identified in Establishes 
structure, authority, and responsibility (CE-3), 24.4% in Deploys through policies and 
procedures (CA-3), and 17.8% in Exercises oversight responsibility (CE-2) (Figure 12). 
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Figure 12.  17 Principles Percentages of Frequency of Weaknesses by DOD 
Departments 
 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
3. Correlation between Contract Management Deficiencies and Internal 
Controls Weaknesses 
In general, when the relationship between contract management deficiencies and 
internal controls weaknesses were analyzed, weak correlations were found. However, 
there were some relationships that showed a moderate positive correlation between 
deficiencies in contract management processes and weaknesses in internal control 
components in each DODIG report. There were moderate positive correlations between 
Required Sources of Supply (PP-2) and Evaluates and communicates deficiencies (MA-
2) at 0.306462, Determine Terms and Condition (SP-6) and Demonstrates commitment to 
integrity and ethical values (CE-1) at 0.401293, Conduct conferences (CA-1) and Selects 
and develops control activities (CA-1) at 0.573436, Conduct conferences (CA-1) and 
Conduct ongoing and/or separate evaluations (MA-1) at 0.389815. Table 5 shows the 
results of those correlations between the key activities of the contract management 
processes and the 17 principles related to internal control components that were 
 61 
moderately positive in each DODIG report. Table 5 does not depict any of the top three 
areas of key activities in contract management deficiencies or principles in internal 
controls weaknesses that were identified from the analysis. 
Table 5.   Correlation between Contract Management Deficiencies and 
Internal Controls Weaknesses 
Contract Management Key Practice Activity 17 Principles related to Internal Control 
Component 
Correlation 
PP-2 (Required Sources of Supply and 
Services in Procurement Planning) 
MA-2(Evaluates and communicates 
deficiencies Monitoring Activity)  
0.306462 
SP-6 (Determine Terms and Condition in 
Solicitation Planning) 
CE-1(Demonstrates commitment to 
integrity and ethical values in Control 
Environment) 
0.401293 
CA-1(Conduct conferences in Contract 
Administration) 
CA-1 (Selects and develops control 
activities in Control Activity) 
0.573436 
CA-1(Conduct conferences in Contract 
Administration) 
MA-1(Conduct ongoing and/or separate 
evaluations in Monitoring Activity) 
0.389815 
The 149 Department of Defense IG reports used in this analysis were obtained from the 
DODIG website at http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/index.cfm. 
C. IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS 
1. Contract Management Processes  
Based on the most frequent deficiencies identified within the key process areas, 
there are implications with concerns to risks that need to be addressed. These frequencies 
appeared in Procurement Planning, Solicitation Planning, and Contract Administration. 
The patterns of deficiencies appear to be uniform across the service departments as 
having risk areas that need to be mitigated in the contract management processes. The 
DOD Other Agencies, Navy, Army, and Air Force appear to have higher deficiencies in 
Contract Administration. These implications of risk in key process areas make it difficult 
for DOD to provide assurance with integrity, accountability, and transparency in the 
contract management processes and also show failure in using appropriate internal 
controls. 
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In Procurement Planning, the deficiencies that occurred most frequently were in 
Acquisition Planning due to not using full and open competition (PP-3), which is a risk 
for assuring transparency, and fair prices. The contracting officers used incorrect 
commercial item determinations causing greater difficulties in interoperability and 
potential waste. In addition, contracting officers could not determine whether it was more 
economical to lease or purchase equipment in many circumstances allowing for a risk in 
accountability and waste of money and equipment. Another major risk and failure was 
not using proven methods like acquisition streamlining implicating that the government 
might not be receiving the most efficient and effective resources to design, develop, and 
produce systems. 
In Solicitation Planning, the deficiencies that occurred most frequently were in 
Determining the contract type and incentive deficiencies (SP-5). The DOD service 
departments could not ensure that they were obtaining the best value for the money spent 
and could not ensure that they were paying fair and reasonable prices for the government. 
The DOD service departments failed to select the correct type of contract in many 
instances costing the government millions in unnecessary waste and risk in accountability. 
An example of this deficiency was a lack of price competition, price analysis, cost 
analysis, or adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system data or past performance. 
In Contract Administration, the deficiencies that occurred most frequently were in 
Monitor and measure contract performance (CA-5) and Comply with terms and 
conditions (CA-11). The DOD service department deficiencies occurred due to lack of 
oversight and lack of surveillance of the contractor’s performance as required by FAR 46 
to ensure efficiency and effectiveness of the contractor performance. The risk to DOD 
service departments of not monitoring the contractor performance is that the government 
could be paying the contractor for work that the contractor is not performing. If the 
government is not monitoring the contractor, then the government would not know if the 
contractor is meeting the contract specifications. Lack of contractor surveillance might 
have a direct impact on the warfighter’s needs not being met. 
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2. Internal Controls  
Based on the findings, the internal control component weaknesses that occurred 
most frequently were in Control Environment, specifically exercising oversight 
responsibility (CE-2) and establishing structure, authority, and responsibility (CE-3). As 
explained in Chapter II, the Control Environment is the foundation for the other 
components of internal controls. The weaknesses in Control Environment may affect the 
effectiveness of internal controls.  As a result of these weaknesses, the DOD cannot meet 
the organizations objectives because they cannot establish sufficient standards, processes, 
and structures. The risk in not meeting the objectives may impact the warfighter’s needs 
not being met. 
Another area of concern that had the second most frequently occurring 
weaknesses of the internal control components were in Control Activities, specifically in 
implementing Control Activities through policies and procedures (CA-3). The 
weaknesses in Control Activities may have a risk in affecting the ability of 
implementation towards achieving the organization’s objectives. As a result, the DOD 
may have limited assurance about following appropriate practices to obtain the goods and 
services required to meet the warfighter’s needs.  
Yet, another area of concern that had the third most frequently occurring 
weaknesses of the internal control components were in Risk Assessment, specifically in 
Identifies and analyzes risk (RA-2). The weaknesses in Risk Assessment may be a result 
of overlooking specific threats that may be critical functions for an organization to have 
an effective internal control system. As a result, the DOD may fail to accomplish the 
organization’s objectives.  
Even though there was not a high level of internal control weaknesses in 
monitoring activities there was a moderate correlation between Monitoring Activities and 
Procurement Planning and Contract Administration. As discussed in Chapter II, 
Monitoring Activities are crucial to making sure that internal controls remain effective 
through evolving objectives, environments, regulations, resources, and risks. Monitoring 
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Activities are vitally important to make sure the all the internal control components are 
working properly. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Introduction 
DOD leadership should be aware of deficiencies in contract management and the 
weaknesses in internal controls based on these 149 DODIG reports. DOD leaders should 
also be aware of all of these problems because contract management has been on the high 
risk list since 1992. Yet, the problems that are repeatedly noted by the DODIG reports 
related to contract management processes include: lack of acquisition planning, lack of 
determining the contract type and incentive, lack of monitoring and measuring the 
contractor’s performance for contract management, and lack of exercising oversight 
responsibility. The issues repeatedly noted by the DODIG reports for internal control 
components include: establish structure, establish authority and responsibility, identify 
and analyze risk, and deploy control activities through policies and procedures for 
internal controls. In order to improve the contract management processes and internal 
control components, the DOD will need to enhance its integrity, accountability, and 
transparency. Several recommendations addressed to fix the problems are improving or 
adding more training, developing additional policies and guidance, strengthening 
implementations abilities, and enforcing oversight of contracts. 
2. Contract Management  
a. Improving or Adding More Training  
The first recommendation is for the DOD to improve its training by giving more 
attention to the contract management processes, specifically, Procurement Planning, 
Solicitation Planning, and Contract Administration. Enhancing training in contract 
management processes will reduce the risks and help improve collaboration with 
government and industry personnel, obtain better value for money spent, and ensure the 
warfighter’s needs are met. As mentioned in the literature review, the DOD acquisition 
expenditure has increased considerably, while the workforce is experiencing many new 
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acquisition personnel and the looming retirements of the baby boomer generation. This is 
a problem that can be handled with the right implementation of more training and cross 
training of acquisitions personnel’s knowledge. It should be noted that the 
recommendation for additional training is not necessarily just for the contracting 
workforce, but for the other members of the acquisition workforce that have roles and 
responsibilities in the procurement of supplies and services. A recommendation to all 
DOD departments is that leadership should ensure that training of the program managers, 
senior executives, requirements personnel, technical representatives and CORs should be 
a priority, and this should include ongoing professional workshops and training classes in 
contract management processes. If the government wants to save more money, it has to 
invest in appropriately training all members of the acquisition workforce. There are a 
great deal of lessons to be learned from the DODIG reports that should also be discussed 
amongst program managers, senior executives, requirements personnel, technical 
representatives and CORs so that these documented deficiencies and weaknesses can be 
reduced in the future.  
b. Practice Policies and Procedures Properly  
The second recommendation to the DOD departments is to enforce the practice of 
procurement policies and procedures and offer appropriate training for senior executives, 
program managers, contracting officers, requirements personnel, technical 
representatives, and CORs. Senior executives, program managers, requirements 
personnel, technical representatives, and CORs involvement will help properly develop 
the appropriate requirements and documents during the procurement planning and 
solicitation planning processes. The contracting officer should also follow the guidelines 
in the FAR by using full and open competition when possible, making the correct 
commercial item determinations, making appropriate determinations on when to lease or 
purchase equipment, and using acquisition streamlining to ensure efficient and effective 
resources for acquisition procurements. Yet, the DODIG continues to find similar 
patterns of deficiencies in these areas even with all the DOD policies, statutes, and the 
FAR, which require compliance with contract management processes. Program 
managers, senior executives, requirements personnel, technical representatives and CORs 
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need to ensure practice and compliance with acquisition policies and procedures. The 
contracting officers should be there to help assist and advise them in getting training or 
knowledge to understanding compliance with acquisition policies and procedures. 
c. Proper Oversight of Contractors 
The third recommendation to the DOD departments is to personally assign 
responsibility to senior executives, base commanders, program managers, contracting 
officers, requirements personnel, technical representatives, and CORs involved with the 
procurement for providing oversight of contractors. This will not only instill personal 
pride within the departments, but will also make the entire workplace an environment that 
provides for integrity, accountability, and transparency of the government’s resources. 
The DODIG data suggest that CORs are doing a poor job of monitoring and measuring 
the contractors’ performance due to a lack of oversight and surveillance. It is 
recommended that the DOD department’s branches emphasize the proper oversight of 
contractors and the importance of CORs to all senior executives, base commanders for 
installations, program managers for weapon systems, to assist with contractor 
surveillance. Senior executives, program managers, and base commanders should realize 
that contractors performing missions in support of their organization are an extension of 
their organizational structure and an extension of their people. An enhanced emphasis on 
oversight of contractors performing functions should be the focus. The people who 
currently provide oversight on the contractor are the CORs. The CORs are not 
contracting officers, but they are technical representatives that need additional training on 
oversight of contractor performance.  
Since the DODIG reports identified concerns with contractor performance, it is 
recommended that senior executives, program managers, contracting officers, 
requirements personnel, technical representatives, and CORs document their oversight 
and follow up with these issues by having a healthy professional relationship with both 
the contractor and government personnel. Also, if the DOD documents and publishes the 
lessons learned with contract management processes then the senior executives, base 
commanders, program managers, contracting officers, requirements personnel, technical 
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representatives, and CORs may want to improve the deficient contract management 
processes.  
3. Internal Controls 
a. Additional Policy and Guidance 
The first recommendation is for the DOD to establish additional policies and 
guidance in order to improve the Control Environment. For example, the DOD should 
create more procedures so it can maintain or update the organization’s record files 
appropriately. Also, the DOD should establish more internal control procedures for 
contract management to determine the independence of offerors or sellers for 
noncompetitive contracts before depending on the solicitation planning processes to 
decide price reasonableness, implement an effective cost or pricing data analysis, and 
follow the legislative guidance. 
b. Practice Policies and Procedures Properly  
The second recommendation is for the DOD to practice established policies and 
procedures properly in order to improve the Control Activities. Even though the 
organization has sufficient policies and guidance, the organization cannot achieve its 
objective without practicing those policies and guidance. DOD should maintain 
practicing established policies and procedures by appropriate oversight, education, and 
training. Also, DOD should continuously monitor and evaluate the organization’s 
activities to identify the potential or existing issues.    
c. Strengthen Oversight 
The third recommendation is for the DOD to strengthen oversight with CORs in 
order to improve the Control Environment, Control Activities, and Risk Assessment. As 
mentioned in Chapter II, the oversight body should properly oversee the organization’s 
development and implementation of internal controls. The DOD should establish an 
effective oversight strategy, policy, and procedures to implement appropriate oversight 
within the contract management processes.  For example, additional oversight would help 
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improved contract management processes such as Solicitation Planning, Contract 
Administration, and Procurement Planning. Also, the DOD should hire personnel who 
have the appropriate skills, knowledge, and relevant expertise so that the organizations 
can reduce contract management deficiencies and internal control weaknesses.  
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the findings of this research. Also presented were the 
implications of these findings and recommendations to the DOD for improving the 
contract management processes and the effectiveness of the internal controls based on the 
findings.  In the analysis, all DOD departments displayed substantially similar patterns of 
deficiencies and weaknesses. In general, DOD contract management processes and 
internal control components should be well identified and understood by the DOD, but 
they still pose problems in the identified GAO high risk category. By implementing some 
of the recommendations provided, the DOD may decrease their deficiencies in contract 
management and weaknesses in internal controls. The next chapter summarizes the 
research, presents the conclusion, and identifies areas for further research. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND AREAS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
The Department of Defense (DOD) spends over $300 billion dollars each year on 
contracts to sustain the organization as an operational military force (Government 
Accountability Office [GAO], 2015). However, the DODIG has identified many 
deficiencies within DOD contract management. The DODIG outlines these deficiencies 
in their DODIG reports. Each of these reported deficiencies is related to material 
weaknesses in internal controls. The purpose of this research was to analyze DODIG 
reported deficiencies to determine to which contract management processes these 
deficiencies are related and to which internal control components these weaknesses are 
related.  
B. CONCLUSION 
1. Research Questions 
The following sections are the study’s research questions and summary of the 
answers to those questions.   
a. Which Contract Management Processes Are Related to the DODIG 
Reported Deficiencies? 
The highest deficiencies found in the contract management processes and key 
areas across the service departments occurred in the following areas: Procurement 
Planning: Acquisition planning; Solicitation Planning: Determine contract type and 
incentive; and Contract Administration: Monitor and measure contract performance. This 
pattern appears to be uniform across the service departments as having risk areas that 
need to be mitigated in the contract management processes. The DOD Other Agencies, 
Navy, Army, and Air Force appear to have higher deficiencies in Contract Administration. 
Each DOD department had a similar frequency of deficiencies in their contract 
management processes, and overall, the percentages indicate that all DOD departments 
had similar deficiencies in these three top areas.  
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b. Which internal control components are related to the DODIG-reported 
weaknesses?   
The weaknesses found in internal control components frequently occurred in the 
areas of Control Environment, Control Activities, and Risk Assessment.  The Control 
Environment had the biggest number of the weaknesses of internal controls in the DOD 
procurement processes and procedures. Each DOD department has similar frequencies of 
internal control weaknesses. According to the analysis, Exercises oversight responsibility 
(CE-2), Establishes structure, authority, and responsibility (CE-3), Identifies and analyzes 
risk (RA-2), Deploys through policies and procedures (CA-3) may be the most significant 
problem areas for internal controls in the DOD. 
c. What patterns or consistencies does the data from the DOD Inspector 
General reports show regarding the deficiencies in contract 
management processes and weaknesses in internal control components?  
The analysis of the DODIG data presented the frequencies of deficiencies in the 
DOD contract management processes and weaknesses in internal control components. In 
the analysis, all of the DOD departments displayed substantially similar patterns in the 
areas of deficiencies and weaknesses. This did not allow singling out any particular 
department for significant nonconformity from the overall patterns in the DOD 
departments. In general, both contract management deficiencies and internal control 
weaknesses should be well identified and understood by the DOD; however, they still 
pose problems in the identified GAO high risk category.  
2. Areas for Further Research 
This section has three recommendations for further research. The first 
recommendation is to continue the existing study by analyzing more DODIG reports 
from 2011 to 2015 or from a current, future year and also by creating other modifications 
to the data collection of publicly available reports. The second recommendation for 
continuing research is to analyze GAO reports to identify deficiencies and weaknesses as 
was done in this study. The third and final recommendation is to continue looking for 
more opportunities to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in procurement by following the 
contract management processes and internal control components. For example, analyzing 
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the amount of dollars spent by DOD and number of contracts conducted to see if there is 
a correlation of deficiencies found in contract management processes and weaknesses 

























APPENDIX.  DODIG REPORTS USED IN DATA COLLECTION 
 
DODIG Report No. 2010-087 DODIG Report No.2008-134 
DODIG Report No.2010-085 DODIG Report No.2008-129 
DODIG Report No.2010-081 DODIG Report No.2008-127 
DODIG Report No.2010-080 DODIG Report No.2008-107 
DODIG Report No.2010-079 DODIG Report No.2008-100 
DODIG Report No.2010-078 DODIG Report No.2008-099 
DODIG Report No.2010-068 DODIG Report No.2008-097 
DODIG Report No.2010-066 DODIG Report No.2008-094 
DODIG Report No.2010-064 DODIG Report No.2008-089 
DODIG Report No.2010-063 DODIG Report No.2008-086 
DODIG Report No.2010-057 DODIG Report No.2008-082 
DODIG Report No.2010-055 DODIG Report No.2008-066 
DODIG Report No.2010-054 DODIG Report No.2008-064 
DODIG Report No.2010-052 DODIG Report No.2008-057 
DODIG Report No.2010-051 DODIG Report No.2008-051 
DODIG Report No.2010-049 DODIG Report No.2008-050 
DODIG Report No.2010-047 DODIG Report No.2008-048 
DODIG Report No.2010-046 DODIG Report No.2008-038 
DODIG Report No.2010-035 DODIG Report No.2008-037 
DODIG Report No.2010-028 DODIG Report No.2008-036 
DODIG Report No.2010-027 DODIG Report No.2008-032 
DODIG Report No.2008-135 DODIG Report No.2008-030 
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DODIG Report No.2008-007 DODIG Report No.2007-042 
DODIG Report No.2007-130 DODIG Report No.2007-038 
DODIG Report No.2007-128 DODIG Report No.2007-036 
DODIG Report No.2007-124 DODIG Report No.2007-032 
DODIG Report No.2007-119 DODIG Report No.2007-026 
DODIG Report No.2007-118 DODIG Report No.2007-023 
DODIG Report No.2007-115 DODIG Report No.2007-009 
DODIG Report No.2007-112 DODIG Report No.2007-008 
DODIG Report No.2007-110 DODIG Report No.2007-007 
DODIG Report No.2007-109 DODIG Report No.2007-005 
DODIG Report No.2007-107 DODIG Report No.2006-123 
DODIG Report No.2007-106 DODIG Report No.2006-122 
DODIG Report No.2007-103 DODIG Report No.2006-115 
DODIG Report No.2007-098 DODIG Report No.2006-111 
DODIG Report No.2007-084 DODIG Report No.2006-109 
DODIG Report No.2007-079 DODIG Report No.2006-105 
DODIG Report No.2007-078 DODIG Report No.2006-104 
DODIG Report No.2007-075 DODIG Report No.2006-103 
DODIG Report No.2007-066 DODIG Report No.2006-102 
DODIG Report No.2007-062 DODIG Report No.2006-101 
DODIG Report No.2007-055 DODIG Report No.2006-100 
DODIG Report No.2007-047 DODIG Report No.2006-097 
DODIG Report No.2007-044 DODIG Report No.2006-093 
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DODIG Report No.2006-088 DODIG Report No.2004-113 
DODIG Report No.2006-087 DODIG Report No.2004-112 
DODIG Report No.2006-080 DODIG Report No.2004-111 
DODIG Report No.2006-073 DODIG Report No.2004-110 
DODIG Report No.2006-066 DODIG Report No.2004-104 
DODIG Report No.2006-065 DODIG Report No.2004-103 
DODIG Report No.2006-061 DODIG Report No.2004-102 
DODIG Report No.2006-059 DODIG Report No.2004-094 
DODIG Report No.2006-058 DODIG Report No.2004-093 
DODIG Report No.2006-055 DODIG Report No.2004-084 
DODIG Report No.2006-029 DODIG Report No.2004-073 
DODIG Report No.2006-010 DODIG Report No.2004-070 
DODIG Report No.2006-007 DODIG Report No.2004-069 
DODIG Report No.2006-006 DODIG Report No.2004-064 
DODIG Report No.2006-004 DODIG Report No.2004-057 
DODIG Report No.2006-001 DODIG Report No.2004-056 
DODIG Report No.2005-096 DODIG Report No.2004-055 
DODIG Report No.2005-091 DODIG Report No.2004-052 
DODIG Report No.2005-037 DODIG Report No.2004-047 
DODIG Report No.2005-028 DODIG Report No.2004-046 
DODIG Report No.2005-027 DODIG Report No.2004-037 
DODIG Report No.2005-009 DODIG Report No.2004-020 
DODIG Report No.2005-005 DODIG Report No.2004-015 
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DODIG Report No.2004-012 
DODIG Report No.2003-120 
DODIG Report No.2003-115 
DODIG Report No.2003-113 
DODIG Report No.2003-106 
DODIG Report No.2003-099 
DODIG Report No.2003-090 
DODIG Report No.2003-083 
DODIG Report No.2003-082 
DODIG Report No.2003-077 
DODIG Report No.2003-056 
DODIG Report No.2003-029 
DODIG Report No.2003-016 
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